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Abstract
Iterated admissibility is a well-known and important concept in classical game theory,
e.g. to determine rational behaviors in multi-player matrix games. As recently shown by
Berwanger, this concept can be soundly extended to infinite games played on graphs with
ω-regular objectives. In this paper, we study the algorithmic properties of this concept
for such games. We settle the exact complexity of natural decision problems on the set
of strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies. As a byproduct of
our construction, we obtain automata which recognize all the possible outcomes of such
strategies.
1 Introduction
Two-player games played on graphs are central in many applications of computer science. For
example, in the synthesis problem for reactive systems, implementations are obtained from
winning strategies in games with a ω-regular objectives [1]. To analyze systems composed of
several components, two-player games are extended to multi-player games with non zero-sum
objectives, i.e. each player has his own objective expressed as a ω-regular specification which
is not necessarily adversarial w.r.t. the objectives of the other players.
C D
A (0, 2) (1, 1)
B (1, 1) (1, 2)
Figure 1: A two-player matrix game.
To analyze multi-player games in normal form
(a.k.a. matrix games), concepts like the celebrated
Nash equilibrium [2] have been proposed. Another
central concept is the notion of dominated strategy [3].
A strategy of a player dominates another one if the
outcome of the first strategy is better than the out-
come of the second no matter how the other players
play. In two-player matrix game of Figure 1, strategies
of player 1 (of player 2 respectively) are given as rows
of the matrix (as columns respectively), and the payoffs to be maximized, are given as pairs of
integers (the first for player 1 and the second for player 2). Strategy B of player 1 dominates
strategy A: no matter how player 2 plays, B provides an outcome which is larger than or
equal to the one of A, and if player 2 plays C then the outcome provided by B is strictly
larger than the outcome of A. On the other hand, player 2 at first sight has no preference
between C and D. But if player 2 knows that player 1 prefers strategy B to strategy A, then
he will in turn prefer D to C, and it is then reasonable to predict that (B,D) will be played.
This process is called the iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and it is valid under
the hypothesis that rationality is common knowledge among the players [4]. Strategies that
survive the iterated elimination of strategies are called iteratively admissible strategies.
∗Work supported by ERC Starting Grant inVEST (279499).
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In [5], Berwanger initiated a fundamental study of the notion of rational behaviour in in-
finite duration games played on graph by generalising the notion of strategy dominance and
iterated elimination of dominated strategies to that setting. This solution concept is a clear
potential alternative to Nash equilibria for those games. As pointed out by Berwanger, one
important advantage of admissible strategies is that they are compatible with the sequential
nature of games played on graphs: “in any position reachable with an admissible strategy, a
strategy is admissible in the sub-game rooted in that position if, and only if, it is the restric-
tion of an admissible strategy in the original game.” As a consequence, admissibility does
not feature non-credible threats while it is well known that it is the case for Nash equilib-
ria. Nonetheless, the extension of iterated strategy elimination to infinite duration games
is challenging as the set of strategies is infinite and may lead to infinite dominance chains.
Berwanger’s main technical results are as follows: all iteration stages are dominated by ad-
missible strategies, the iteration is non-stagnating, and, under regular objectives, admissible
strategies form a regular set. In particular, for the last result, Berwanger suggests a proce-
dure that uses tree automata to represent sets of strategies. The closure of tree automata
to projection and Boolean operations naturally provides an algorithm to compute admissible
strategies in parity games but this algorithm has non-elementary complexity.
In order to represent a viable alternative to Nash equilibria from a computational point
of view, it is fundamental to better understand the complexity of iterated elimination of
dominated strategies in ω-regular games, and see if the non-elementary complexity of the
tree-automata based procedure can be avoided. We prove here that this is indeed the case
and that iterated elimination of dominated strategies has a computational complexity similar
to the one of Nash equilibria. More precisely, we study games with weak Muller and (classical)
Muller winning conditions given as circuits. Circuits offer a concise representation of Muller
conditions and are closed (while remaining succinct) under Boolean operations. Weak Muller
conditions define objectives based on the set of states that occur along a run, they generalize
safety and reachability objectives. (Classical) Muller conditions define objectives based on
the set of states that appear infinitely often along a run. They generalize Bu¨chi and parity
objectives and are canonical representations of ω-regular objectives as every regular language
can be accepted by a deterministic Muller automaton. We study the winning coalition problem:
given a game and two subsets W,L of players, to determine whether there exists an iteratively
admissible profile of strategies that guarantees that (i) all players of W win the game, and
(ii) all players of L lose the game (other players may either win or lose). For weak and
classical Muller objectives, we provide a procedure in PSPACE, with matching lower-bounds
for safety, reachability, and Muller objectives. For Bu¨chi objectives, we provide an algorithm
that calls a polynomial number of times an oracle solving parity games (hence this would
lead to a polynomial time solution if a polynomial time algorithm is found for parity games –
the current best known complexity is UP∩ coUP [6], although a deterministic subexponential
algorithm exists [7]).
As a byproduct of our constructions, we obtain an automaton on infinite words which
recognizes all the possible outcomes of iteratively admissible strategies. Any regular query
on this language can be solved using classical automata techniques. As a consequence, we
can solve any variant of the winning coalition problem defined above, if this variant can be
expresse as such a query. For example, we can solve the model-checking under admissibility
problem: given ϕ, an LTL formula [8, 9], does the outcome of every iteratively admissible
profile satisfy ϕ? We show that this problem is complete for the class PSPACE, so it retains
the same complexity as the “classical” model-checking problem for this logic. Model-checking
under admissibility is useful to reason about properties that naturally emerge in a system from
the interaction of rational agents that purse their own objectives.
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Related work. Dominance can be expressed in strategy logics [10, 11] but not un-
bounded iterated dominance. Bounded iterated dominance is expressible but leads to classes
of formulas with a non-elementary model-checking algorithm. Other paradigms of rational-
ity have been studied for games on finite graphs, like Nash-equilibria [12, 13, 14] or regret
minimization [15]. In [14], the authors build an automaton that recognizes outcomes of Nash
equilibria. In turn-based game, finding a Nash equilibrium with a particular payoff is PSPACE-
complete for Muller objectives [16], which is the same complexity we obtain for admissibility.
In the case of Bu¨chi objectives, a polynomial algorithm exists for Nash equilibria [12], while
we have a NP ∩ coNP algorithm for admissibility.
In this paper, we concentrate on n-player turn-based perfect information finite game graph
with ω-regular objective. This is the basic setting that needs to be studied before looking at
richer models, like games with incomplete information [17], games with quantitative objectives
like mean-payoff objectives [18], or concurrent games [19]. Our results and techniques are
clearly prerequisites to study those richer settings.
Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first
formalize the setting and the notations in Section 2. Then we solve the case of games with
safety objectives, in Section 3, which gives rise to a simple notion of dominance.
We then give the more general algorithm and constructions for Muller objectives in Sec-
tion 4. This include the special case of Bu¨chi objectives (Section 4.7) as well as the algorithm
solving the model-checking under admissibility problem (Section 4.8).
A comprehensive example of iterated elimination of dominated strategies and model-
checking under admissibility is provided in Section 5.
In Section 6, we generalize the algorithm for safety with weak Muller objectives.
2 Definitions
2.1 Multiplayer Games
Definition 2.1 (Multiplayer games). A turn-based multiplayer (non zero-sum) game is a
tuple G = 〈P, (Vi)i∈P , E, (Wini)i∈P 〉 where:
• P is the non-empty and finite set of players;
• V =
⊎
i∈P Vi and for every i in P , Vi is the finite set of player i’s states;
• E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges1; we write s → t for (s, t) ∈ E when E is clear from
context.
• For every i in P , Wini ⊆ V
ω is a winning condition.
A path ρ is a sequence of states (ρj)0≤j<n with n ∈ N ∪ {∞} s.t. for all j < n − 1,
ρj → ρj+1. The length |ρ| of the path ρ is n. A history is a finite path and a run is an infinite
path. Given a run ρ = (ρj)j∈N and an integer k, we write ρ≤k the history (ρj)0≤j<k+1, that is,
the prefix of length k+1 of ρ. For a history ρ and a (finite or infinite) path ρ′, ρ is a prefix of
ρ′ is written ρ< ρ′. The last state of a history ρ is last(ρ) = ρ|ρ|−1. The set of states occuring
in a path ρ is Occ(ρ) = {s ∈ V | ∃i ∈ N. i < |ρ|, ρi = s}. The set of states occuring infinitely
often in a run ρ is Inf(ρ) = {s ∈ V | ∀j ∈ N. ∃i > j, ρi = s}.
Definition 2.2 (Strategies). A strategy of player i is a function σi : (V
∗ ·Vi)→ V , such that
if σi(ρ) = s then (last(ρ), s) ∈ E. A strategy profile for the set of players P
′ ⊆ P is a tuple of
strategies, one for each player of P ′.
1It is assumed for convinience and w.l.o.g. that each state in V has at least one outgoing edge.
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Let Si(G) be the set of all strategies of player i in G; we write Si when G is clear from
the context. We write S =
∏
i∈P Si for the set of all strategy profiles for P , and S−i for the
set of strategy profiles for all players but i. If σ−i = (σj)j∈P\{i} ∈ S−i, we write (σi, σ−i) for
(σj)j∈P . Similarly, if S is a set of profiles, Si denotes the i-th projection of S, i.e. a set of
strategies for player i. A rectangular set of strategy profiles is a set that can be decomposed
as a Cartesian product of sets of strategies, one for each player.
A strategy profile σP ∈ S defines a unique outcome from state s: Outs(σP ) is the run
ρ = (ρj)j∈N s.t. ρ0 = s and for j ≥ 0, if ρj ∈ Vi, then ρj+1 = σi(ρ≤j). If Si is a set of
strategies for player i, we write Outs(Si) for {ρ | ∃σi ∈ Si, σ−i ∈ S−i. Outs(σi, σ−i) = ρ}.
For a tuple of sets of strategies SP ′ with P
′ ⊆ P , we write Outs(SP ′) =
⋂
i∈P ′ Outs(Si). A
strategy σi of player i is said to be winning from state s against a rectangular set S−i ⊆ S−i,
if for all σ−i ∈ S−i, Outs(σi, σ−i) ∈Wini. It is simply said winning from state s if S−i = S−i.
For each player i, we write Winsi (σP ) if Outs(σP ) ∈Wini.
2.2 Winning conditions
Winning conditions for each player are given by accepting sets either on the set of states
occurring along the run, or the set of states occurring infinitely often. Particular cases are
safety, reachability, and Bu¨chi winning conditions.
• A safety condition is defined by a set Bad i ⊆ V : Wini = (V \ Bad i)
ω.
• A reachability condition is defined by a set Good i ⊆ V : Wini = V
∗ ·Good i · V
ω.
• A Bu¨chi condition is defined by a set Fi ⊆ V : Wini = (V
∗ · Fi)
ω.
• AMuller condition is given by a family F of sets of states: Wini = {ρ | Inf(ρ) ∈ F}. For
a succinct representation, we assume F is given by a Boolean circuit whose inputs are the
states of V , and which evaluates to true on valuation vS : s 7→ 1 if s ∈ S; 0 otherwise;
if, and only if, S ∈ F [20].
• A weak Muller condition is given by a family F of sets of states: Wini = {ρ | Occ(ρ) ∈
F}. We again assume that F is given by a Boolean circuit.
Muller conditions generalize Bu¨chi and other classical conditions such as parity: these
can be encoded by a circuit of polynomial size [20]. Note that Muller conditions are prefix-
independent : for any finite path h and infinite path ρ′, h·ρ′ ∈Wini ⇔ ρ
′ ∈Wini. In two-player
zero-sum games with circuit conditions, deciding the winner is PSPACE-complete [20]. Weak
Muller conditions generalize safety and reachability.
2.3 Admissibility
Definition 2.3 (Dominance for strategies). Let S =
∏
i∈P Si ⊆ S be a rectangular set of
strategy profiles. Let σ, σ′ ∈ Si. Strategy σ very weakly dominates strategy σ
′ with respect to
S, written σ <S σ
′, if from all states s:
∀τ ∈ S−i,Win
s
i (σ
′, τ)⇒Winsi (σ, τ).
Strategy σ weakly dominates strategy σ′ with respect to S, written σ ≻S σ
′, if σ <S σ
′ and
¬(σ′ <S σ). A strategy σ ∈ Si is dominated in S if there exists σ
′ ∈ Si such that σ
′ ≻S σ. A
strategy that is not dominated in S is admissible in S. A profile σP such that for all i ∈ P ,
σi is admissible is called an admissible profile.
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q0 q1 q2 ∈ Bad1
q3 ∈ Bad2q4
(a) A safety game.
q′0q
′
1q
′
2
q′3 q
′
4
q1q0
q4
Bad1
Bad2
(b) Its unfolding. Transitions eliminated after two steps of elim-
ination are dotted.
Figure 2: A safety game and its unfolding. States controlled by player 1 are represented with
circles and states controlled by player 2 with squares. We keep this convention through the
paper. The objective of player 1 is to avoid q2 and that of player 2 is to avoid q3.
The set S∗ of iteratively admissible strategies is obtained by iteratively eliminating domi-
nated strategies, starting from set S. Formally, we consider the sequence:
• S0 = S;
• Sn+1 =
∏
i∈P {σi ∈ S
n
i | σi admissible in S
n}.
Then S∗ =
⋂
n∈N S
n. When for all player i ∈ P , Wini is ω-regular winning conditions, S
∗ is
reached after finitely many iterations and is not empty [5].
Note that our strategies are defined from all states while in [5] they are defined only for
history starting from the initial state. A strategy here can be seen as a tuple of strategies (in
the sense of [5]): one for each state. The set Sn we compute is then the cardinal product of
admissible strategies from each state.
Example 2.4. Figure 2(a) presents a safety game that starts in q0. Strategies of player 1 that
from q0 go to q4 are losing. Whereas for those that go to q1, there is a strategy of player 2
which helps player 1 to win by playing back to q0. Hence the former are dominated by the
later, and so they are eliminated at the first elimination of dominated strategies and do not
appear in S11 . In the second step of iteration, if player 2 plays from q1 to q0, he is ensured
to win if player 1 plays a strategy of S11 . Therefore the strategies of player 2 that go to q2
are dominated: there are strategies in S11 that make them lose. These latter strategies are
therefore removed and do not appear in S22 . The process then stabilizes: S
∗ = S2.
2.4 Decision problems
Winning coalition problem. Given a game G and two subsets W,L of players, does
there exist an iteratively admissible profile s.t. all players of W win the game, and all players
of L lose the game (other players may either win or lose)?
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Model-checking under admissibility problem. Given a game and an LTL [8, 9]
formula ψ, does the outcome of every iteratively admissible profile satisfy ψ?
2.5 Values
Our algorithms are based on the notion of value of a history. It characterizes whether a player
can win (alone) or cannot win (even with the help of other players), restricting the strategies
to the ones that have not been eliminated so far. This notion is also a central tool in [5] to
characterize admissible strategies. However, [5] gives no practical way to compute values. We
will show in this paper, that these are indeed computable.
Definition 2.5 (Value). The value of history h for player i after the n-th step of elimination,
written Valni (h), is given by:
• if there is no strategy profile σP in S
n whose outcome ρ from last(h) is such that h<|h|−1·ρ
is winning for player i then Valni (h) = −1;
• if there is a strategy of σi ∈ S
n
i such that for all strategy profiles σ−i in S
n
−i, the outcome
ρ of (σi, σ−i) from s is such that h<|h|−1 · ρ is winning for player i then Val
n
i (h) = 1;
• otherwise Valni (h) = 0;
By convention, Val−1i (h) = 0.
The following lemma illustrates a property of values and admissible strategies:
Lemma 2.6. For all n ∈ N, if last(h) ∈ Vi and σi ∈ S
n+1
i then Val
n
i (h) = Val
n
i (h · σi(h)).
Hence a player that plays according to an admissible strategy cannot go to a state that
changes the value of the current history. This condition is not always sufficient, but in the
following sections we characterize runs of admissible strategies relying on this notion of value.
3 Safety objectives
The main result of this section is a PSPACE algorithm for the winning coalition problem
in safety games. This is based on a notion of dominance for transitions. We show that
by iteratively removing dominated transitions of the game, we describe exactly the set of
admissible strategies.
3.1 Making explicit the losing players
Let h be an history, the players losing on h are the players in
λ(h) = {i ∈ P | ∃k < |h|, hk ∈ Bad i}.
Proposition 3.1. For safety winning conditions, the value of a history h only depends on
λ(h) and last(h).
Proof. Since a safety objective can be transformed into a prefix-independent one by remember-
ing which player have already lost, this is a consequence of the fact that for prefix-independent
objectives the value depends only on the last state of the history, as we will see in Proposi-
tion 4.8.
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We can therefore write Valni (λ(h), s) for Val
n
i (h), when last(h) = s. We encode the set
λ(h) of losing players in the state of the game, at the price of an exponential blowup (in the
number of players). The new game has states in 2P ×V and set of transitions (λ, s)→ (λ∪{i |
s′ ∈ Bad i}, s
′) for any λ ⊆ P , if s → s′. In this partially unfolded game, the value depends
only on the current state, hence is written Valni (s). For example, the game of Figure 2(a) is
unfolded as the game of Figure 2(b); states q′0, . . . , q
′
4 are states where player 1 has already
lost. Now, let us assume for the remainder of this section that the losing players in the game
G are explicit.
3.2 Dominance of transitions
In the case of safety winning condition, the necessary condition of Lemma 2.6 becomes suffi-
cient, as shown below. This yields a local notion of dominance, that can be expressed directly
on transitions:
Definition 3.2. We write T ni for the set of transitions s → s
′ ∈ E, such that s is controlled
by player i and Valni (s) > Val
n
i (s
′). Such transitions are said to be dominated after the n-th
step of elimination. We write T n for the union of all T ni .
Definition 3.3 (Subgame). Let G = 〈P, V,E,WinP 〉 be a game and T ⊆ E a set of transi-
tions. If each state s ∈ V has at least one successor by E\T , the game G\T = 〈P, V,E \ T,WinP 〉
is called a subgame of G. We write Si(G \ T ) the set of strategies σi ∈ Si(G) such that for all
history h of G \ T , if last(h) ∈ Vi then (last(h), σi(h)) 6∈ T .
This notion yields a polynomial procedure in the size of the game where losing players are
explicit, to compute the set of all iteratively admissible strategies, described in Algorithm 1.
The loop is executed at most |E| times, where |E| is the number of transitions in the partially
unfolded game.
1 n := 0 ; T−1i := ∅ ;
2 repeat
3 forall the s ∈ V do
4 if there is a winning strategy for player i from s in G \ T n−1 then Valni (s) := 1
else if there is no winning run for player i from s in G \ T n−1 then
Valni (s) := −1 else Val
n
i (s) := 0
5 forall the i ∈ P do
6 T ni := T
n−1
i ∪ {(s, s
′) ∈ E | s ∈ Vi ∧Val
n
i (s) > Val
n
i (s
′)};
7 n := n+ 1 ;
8 until ∀i ∈ P. T ni = T
n−1
i ;
Algorithm 1: Computing the set of iteratively admissible strategies
However, this procedure assumes that the information of which players have already vio-
lated their safety condition is encoded in the state. So in the general case, the procedure has
a complexity which is exponential in the number of players and polynomial in the number of
states of the game. In the case of the winning coalition problem, we can however reduce this
complexity to PSPACE.
We now show the correctness of the procedure. We first prove a link between the notions
of dominance for strategies and for transitions. Note that since all states s have at least one
successor with a value greater or equal to that of s, removing transitions of T ni yield what we
call a subgame.
Proposition 3.4. All admissible strategies w.r.t. Sn of player i are strategies of Si(G \ T
n
i ).
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Proof. We show that if player i plays an strategy σi admissible w.r.t. S
n, i.e. σi ∈ S
n+1
i , then
the value cannot decrease on a transition controled by player i. Let ρ ∈ Out(σi, σ−i) with
σ−i ∈ S
n
−i and σi ∈ S
n+1
i , and ρk ∈ Vi. Let s
′ = σi(ρ≤k):
• If Valni (ρk) = 1, then σi has to be a winning against all strategy of S
n
−i, otherwise it
would be weakly dominated by such a strategy. Since there is no such strategy from a
state with value Valni ≤ 0, Val
n
i (s
′) = 1.
• If Valni (s) = 0, then there is a profile σ−i ∈ S
n
−i such that ρ = Out(σi, σ−i) ∈ Wini.
Note that h · s · s′ < ρ. If Valni (s
′) = −1, there can be no such profile, thus Valni (s
′) ≥ 0.
• If Valni (s) = −1, the value cannot decrease.
Example 3.5. In Figure 2(a), initially, q4 has value −1 for player 1, but q0 has value 0 since it
is possible to loop in q1 and q0 (if player 2 helps). So, the transition to state q4 is dominated
and removed at the first iteration. Then, player 2 has a winning strategy from q1, by always
going back to q0, whereas the state q
′
2 has value 0 for him. Hence q1 → q
′
2 is removed after
this iteration. The fix-point is obtained at that step, it is represented in Figure 2(b).
We have seen that removing dominated transitions only removes strictly dominated strate-
gies. The converse is also true, all strategies that remain are not dominated:
Proposition 3.6. All strategies of Sni ∩ Si(G \ T
n
i ) are admissible with respect to S
n.
Proof. Let σi, σ
′
i ∈ S
n
i ∩ Si(G \ T
n
i ) and assume σ
′
i ≻Sn σi. Then there is a state s and
strategy profile σ−i ∈ S
n
−i such that Win
s
i (σ
′
i, σ−i) ∧ ¬Win
s
i (σi, σ−i). Let ρ = Outs(σi, σ−i)
and ρ′ = Outs(σ
′
i, σ−i). Consider the first position where these runs differ: write ρ = w·s
′·s2·w
′
and ρ′ = w · s′ · s1 · w
′′. Note that s′ belongs to player i.
First remark that sinceWini(σ
′
i, σ−i), it is clear that Val
n
i (s1) ≥ 0. Moreover, since s
′ → s1
and s→ s2 do not belong to T
n
i , states s
′, s1 and s2 must have the same value.
Assume Valni (s
′) = 0. We show that there is a profile2 σ2−i ∈ S
n
−i such that Wini(σi, σ
2
−i)
from s2. Let h be a history such that last(h) /∈ Vi, if for all σ
2
−i ∈ S
n
−i, Val
n
i (σ
2
−i(h)) = −1 then
Valni (last(h)) = −1. Therefore it is possible to define a strategy profile σ
2
−i ∈ S
n
−i that never
decreases the value from 0 or 1 to −1. The strategy σi itself does not decrease the value of
player i because it does not take transitions of T ni . So the outcome of (σi, σ
2
−i) never reaches
a state of value −1. Hence it never reaches a state in Bad i and therefore it is winning for
player i. Now, Valni (s1) = 0 so there is no winning strategy for player i from s1 against all
strategies of Sn−i. Then there exists a strategy profile σ
1
−i ∈ S
n
−i such that σ
′
i loses from s1.
Now consider strategy profile σ′−i that plays like σ−i if the play does not start with w, then
σ1−i after s1 and σ
2
−i after s2. Given a history h:
σ′−i(h) =


σ1−i(h
′) if w · s1 < h and w · s1 · h
′ = h
σ2−i(h
′) if w · s2 < h and w · s2 · h
′ = h
σ−i(h) otherwise
Clearly we have Winsi (σi, σ
′
−i) ∧ ¬Win
s
i (σ
′
i, σ
′
−i), which contradicts σ
′
i <Sn σi.
Now assume Valni (s2) = 1. Since ¬Wini(σi, σ−i), the produced outcome ρ reaches a state
of Bad i, hence the value of states along ρ is −1 after some point. Consider the first state ρk
which has value smaller or equal to 0: k = mink′{ρk′ | Val
n
i (ρk′) ≤ 0}. The state ρk−1 has
value 1, it is necessarily controlled by a player j different from player i, since transitions of
T ni cannot be taken by σi. Since there exists a winning strategy σi ∈ S
n
i from ρk−1 against
strategies of Sn−i, then this strategy is still winning at ρk. Therefore Val
n
i (ρk) = 1, which is a
contradiction.
2Although the definition of the value yields the existence of a profile winning for i, it remains to be shown
that there is such profile where i plays strategy σi.
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3.3 The winning coalition problem for safety objectives
Theorem 3.7. The winning coalition problem with safety winning conditions is PSPACE-
complete. However, if the number of players is fixed, the problem becomes P-complete.
This theorem is proved in the following two lemmata.
Proposition 3.8. The winning coalition problem is in PSPACE.
Proof. First remark that although there is an exponential number of copies of the game over
the graph (V,E) that need to be considered with respect to which players have already lost,
states can be ordered the following way: we say that (λ, s) ≤ (λ′, s′) if λ ⊆ λ′. Along any path
the states are increasing for this order, it can increase strictly at most |P | times, and there are
at most |V | equivalent states. In addition, the value, hence the elimination of transitions, only
depends on the values of greater states, so the iterations stops after at most |P | · |E| phases.
Therefore a procedure to find an iteratively admissible strategy winning at least for players
of W and losing at least for players of L consists in guessing a lasso path ρ that ends in a copy
where W has not lost and L has. This path has length bounded by |P | · |G|.
However the algorithm needs to check that each transition taken by ρ has indeed survived
the elimination of transitions: this transition should not be dominated by any other. This is
done by recursively checking that a transition has survived the j-th elimination phase (recall
that there can be at most |P | · |E| such phases). For a transition ρk → ρk+1 to survive the
j-th phase, the value of ρk+1 needs to be the same than that of ρk for the player controlling s.
To check Valni (ρk), we use the following procedure:
• if we fail to guess a lasso which does not intersect with Bad i in G\T
n from state ρk, then
Valni (ρk) = −1. Note that looking for a path in G \ T
n implies recursively computing
some values of iteration j − 1;
• if there is a winning strategy for player i in the safety game G \ T n with target Bad i,
then Valni (ρk) = 1; note that this can be done by finding a strategy that either never
visits a new set Bad j (hence not increasing for ≤) or visiting a new set Bad j through
a state of value 1 for i (this value being computed recursively, for details, see the more
general proof of Theorem 6.1).
• in the other cases Valni (ρk) = 0.
In all cases, the recursive calls can stack up to |P | · |G|, since they always traverse the set of
states upwards (with respect to ≤).
Proposition 3.9. The winning coalition problem is PSPACE-hard, even for sets of players
W,L ⊆ P such that |W | = 1 and L = ∅.
Proof. We encode a instance of QSAT into a game in which there is an admissible strategy
profile which is winning for Eve if, and only if, the formula is valid.
Given a formula φ = ∃x1∀x2 . . . ψ we associate a game Gφ in which there are one player for
each literal xi or ¬xi and two players Eve and Adam. The construction is recursive separately
over the quantifiers and over the propositional part. If ψ is a propositional formula:
• If ψ = xi then we define the moduleMψ in which player xi has a choice between making
Eve lose or lose himself and let the game continue, this is represented in Figure 3(a).
• If ψ = ¬xi then the construction is similar, with player ¬xi replacing xi, see Figure 3(b).
• If ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 then we put the modules Mψ1 and Mψ2 in sequence, see Figure 3(c).
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xi
xi
∃
(a) Mxi
¬xi
¬xi
∃
(b) M¬xi
Mφ1 Mφ2
(c) Mφ1∧φ2
∃
Mφ1
...
Mφp
(d) Mφ1∨···∨φp
∃
xi
¬xi
Mφ1
(e) M∃xi. φ1
∀
xi
¬xi
Mφ1
(f) M∀xi. φ1
Mφ ∀
(g) Gφ
Figure 3: Modules for the definition of the game Gφ.
• If ψ =
∨
i ψi then Eve has the choice between all modules Mψi , see Figure 3(d).
If φ is a quantified formula:
• If φ = ∃xi. φ1 then Eve has the choice between making xi or ¬xi lose before continuing
to Mφ1 , see Figure 3(e).
• If φ = ∀xi. φ1 is similar but Adam controls the choice, see Figure 3(f).
Finally Gφ is obtained by directing the remaining outgoing transitions of Mφ to a state losing
for Adam, see Figure 3(g). A full example of Gµ with µ = ∃x1∀x2∃x3(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x1 ∨
x2 ∨ x3) is given in Figure 4. Note that any run in Gφ winning for Eve is losing for Adam, and
vice versa.
Given a history of the game, we write λ(h) = {p | ∃i. hi ∈ Badp} the set of player who
already lost on that path. We associate to such a set of players λ, a partial valuation vλ such
that:
vλ(xi) =


1 if xi ∈ λ
0 if ¬xi ∈ λ ∧ xi /∈ λ
undefined otherwise
Note that upon entering Mψ, the module for the propositional part of φ, vλ is a valuation over
variables {xi}i: each variable had exactly one literal visited. We write v∃∀ this valuation.
Let ℓ be a literal. Let S1ℓ be the set of strategies of player ℓ admissible with respect to all
the other strategies, i.e. S1ℓ is the set of admissible strategies after one elimination phase. We
claim that S1ℓ is exactly the set of strategies that, given a history h such that ℓ /∈ λ(h) and
last(h) ∈ Vℓ, do not take the transition to state labeled ℓ.
Indeed, if such a transition is taken by strategy σi, player xi loses while the strategy σ
′
i
that mimics σi up to thisMxi module then chooses the other transition is winning in this case
and preforming in the same way otherwise, thus σ′i ≻S σi.
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Now if σi is a strategy that never chooses the transition to states labeled ℓ unless ℓ ∈ λ(h).
Assume σ′i ≻S σi. Let σ−i be a profile for the other players such that Winℓ(σ
′
i, σ−i) and
¬Winℓ(σi, σ−i). Consider the first time σi and σ
′
i diverged in these plays, after a history h. If
ℓ ∈ λ(h), both plays are losing, hence it is the case that ℓ /∈ λ(h). According to its constraints,
σi chooses to go state losing for Eve, and thus wins since no other state, hence no state labeled
ℓ, is ever visited, which is a contradiction.
Remark that now all the choices that remain for player ℓ is when he has already lost. Thus
the set of admissible strategies for player ℓ is stabilized for these players after one iteration.
The set of strategies S1
Eve
and S1
Adam
of admissible strategies for the first iterations for
players Eve and Adam, respectively, are identical to the initial sets of strategies for these
players. Indeed, Eve can be made to lose or win by the coalition of other players regardless
of her choices. Since the objectives of Adam and Eve are opposite, this is also the case for
Adam. For any history that is not already in a sink state where Eve has lost (then nobody has
choices), other players can play the two following profiles:
1. To make Eve win:
• when in a module Mℓ, player ℓ always chooses to go to the state labeled ℓ (even
though he loses);
• what Adam plays is irrelevant.
This ensures progress toward the end state where Eve wins (and Adam loses).
2. To make Eve lose:
• when in a module Mℓ, player ℓ always chooses to go to the state labeled ∃;
• what Adam plays is irrelevant.
Since these modules are encountered for every path Eve may choose, she loses3 (and
Adam wins).
First, assume that φ is satisfiable. We then show that the admissible strategies of Eve
in the second phase of strategy elimination, S2
Eve
, are the ones corresponding to a satisfaction
of φ. Namely, the choices of Eve in choosing the value of existentially quantified variables
should yield a true propositional formula ψ, which truth is proved by Eve choosing the proper
clause in the case of disjunctions. Indeed, if Eve follows such a strategy the only modules Mℓ
entered are ones where literal ℓ has been set as true by valuation v∃∀. So player ℓ has already
lost in the history of the play, hence transitions to states labeled by ℓ are possible. Since it
is still possible to make Eve lose from these states, one can still devise strategy profiles of
other players that cooperate only with a given strategy of Eve, thus ensuring that it is not
dominated.
On the other hand, if a false literal ℓ is encountered, which will occur if the valuation v∃∀
does not satisfy ψ or if Eve tries to validate a false part of a disjunction, then the player ℓ
has no choice but to make Eve lose, since he must play a strategy of S1ℓ . So all strategies that
do not correspond to the validation of φ are losing even with cooperation of other players, so
they are not admissible4.
Similarly, admissible strategies of Adam, S2
Adam
, require him to choose, if possible (that
means if Eve picked the wrong value for a variable), values for universally quantified variables
that makes ψ false.
3Unless φ is the empty formula, in which case the game is only the sink state, thus there are no real strategies.
4Since some admissible strategy exists.
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The iteration of admissible strategies stops after these two steps. Indeed, the only difference
from Eve’s point of view is the strategies of Adam, which cannot change the result provided
Eve plays to satisfy φ. Conversely, Adam has no better choice than to try to falsify the formula,
even if this case does not arise anymore since strategies of S2
Eve
do not make such mistakes.
Therefore the iteratively admissible strategies of Gφ are the ones in S
2
Eve
× S2
Adam
× S1x1 ×
S1¬x1×· · · . And for any strategy of S
2
Eve
, the strategy profile such that all literal players chose
to go to ℓ whenever possible (i.e. whenever they have already lost) is winning for Eve.
Now assume that φ is not satisfiable. On the other hand, strategies for Adam are
not dominated, S2
Adam
, are actually winning: Adam can choose to play a valuation such that
v∃∀ 2 ψ. With such a valuation, for any choice of Eve in the disjunctions, a module Mℓ is
eventually encountered where v∃∀(ℓ) = 0, so player ℓ has no choice but to make Eve lose, or
equivalently to make Adam win.
Any further elimination is thus useless: any iteratively admissible profile has a strategy
for Adam that makes him win, so Eve loses.
∃
x1
¬x1
∀
x2
¬x2
∃
x3
¬x3
∃
x1
x2
¬x3
x1
∃
x2
∃
¬x3
∃
∃
¬x1
x2
x3
¬x1
∃
x2
∃
x3
∃
∀
Figure 4: Game Gµ with µ = ∃x1∀x2∃x3(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3). A label y inside a
state s denotes that s ∈ Bady; a label y below a state s denotes that s ∈ Vy. Note that Eve is
abbreviated to ∃ and Adam is abbreviated to ∀.
As shown in the above proof, the complexity stems from the number of players rather
that from the number of necessary iteration needed to reach the set of iteratively admissible
strategies:
Corollary 3.10. Deciding whether there exists a profile σP of strategies admissible after 2
iterations such that Occ(Out(σP )) ∩ Bad i = ∅ is PSPACE-hard.
4 Prefix-independent objectives
Our main result for this section is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. The winning coalition problem with a Muller condition for each player is
PSPACE-complete. The problem is PSPACE-hard even when restricted to two players.
PSPACE-hardness follows from PSPACE-hardness of two-player games with Muller condi-
tions [21].
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The idea of the algorithm is to construct a graph representation of the outcomes of ad-
missible profiles. While the construction also relies on the notion of value, it is more involved
than for safety conditions.
After proving Theorem 4.1, we investigate the special case of Bu¨chi winning conditions,
for which we obtain a better complexity:
Theorem 4.2. The winning coalition problem with Bu¨chi objectives is in NP ∩ coNP. More-
over, if there exists a polynomial algorithm for solving two-player parity games, then winning
coalition problem with Bu¨chi objectives is in P.
We also use the fact that this construction provides automata representing the outcomes
of all iteratively admissible profiles to solve the model-checking under admissibility problem
with tight bounds:
Theorem 4.3. The model-checking under admissibility problem is PSPACE-complete.
4.1 Shifting of strategy profiles
In the case of prefix-independent objectives, each player can, at any time change his mind. In
fact, it is possible for a strategy to shift to another (admissible) strategy.
Definition 4.4 (Shifting). Given two strategies σ1 and σ2, and a history h, we denote by
σ1
[
h← σ2
]
the strategy σ that follows strategy σ1 and shifts to σ2 after history h. Formally,
given a history h′:
σ(h′) =
{
σ2(h−1h′) if h< h′
σ1(h′) otherwise
We say that a strategy set S allows shifting, if for any σ1 and σ2 in S, and every history h we
have σ1
[
h← σ2
]
∈ S. A rectangular set of profiles allows shifting if all its components do.
Definition 4.5. We write σi ◦ h the strategy:
σi ◦ h(h
′) =
{
σi(h · h
′
≥1) if h
′
0 = last(h)
σi(h
′) otherwise
Strategy σi ◦h thus plays as if σi was played after a history h. However, if the history does
not start at the end state of h, this would be inconsistent; in that case σi ◦ h plays like σi
Lemma 4.6. If Sn allows shifting, h is compatible with a strategy profile (σj)j∈P of S
n and
σi is in S
n+1
i then σi ◦ h is in S
n+1
i .
Proof. Assuming σi admissible with respect to S
n, we prove that σi ◦ h is also admissible, i.e.
not weakly dominated.
Consider a strategy σ′i ∈ S
n
i . We show that σ
′
i 6≻Sn σi ◦ h, which shows that σi ◦ h is in
Sn+1i . First, if σi ◦ h <Sn σ
′
i, then clearly σ
′
i 6≻Sn σi ◦ h.
Otherwise σi ◦ h 6<Sn σ
′
i. We write σ
′′
i = σi [h← σ
′
i] for the strategy profile that plays
according to σi until history h and then shifts to σ
′
i.
Since σ′i is not weakly dominated by σi ◦ h, there is a state s and a profile τ−i ∈ S
n
−i such
that Outs(τ−i, σ
′
i) ∈Wini and Outs(τ−i, σi◦h) does not win for i. Note that since σi and σi◦h
are identical except when starting from state last(h), it must be the case that s = last(h).
We define the strategy profile τ ′−i = σ−i [h← τ−i] that follows σ−i and until h then shifts
to τ−i. Recall that σ−i is a profile of strategies of S
n
−i such that h < Outh0(σ−i, σi). We
have that Outh0(τ
′
−i, σi) = h ·Out last(h)(τ−i, σi ◦ h) is losing for player i, and Outh0(τ
′
−i, σ
′′
i ) =
h · Out last(h)(τ−i, σ
′
i) is winning for player i, by prefix independence. Moreover τ
′
−i ∈ S
n
−i
because Sn allows shifting by hypothesis. So σi does not weakly dominate σ
′′
i : σi 6<Sn σ
′′
i .
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Since σi is not weakly dominated, in particular σ
′′
i 6≻Sn σi. And by the above result
σi 6<Sn σ
′′
i , so it must be the case that σ
′′
i 6<Sn σi. Hence, there is a strategy profile τ−i
and a state s′ such that Outs′(τ−i, σi) is winning for player i and Outs′(τ−i, σ
′′
i ) is losing
for player i. Since σi and σ
′′
i are identical except after history h, this means that s
′ = h0
and that h is a prefix of both Outh0(τ−i, σi) and Outh0(τ−i, σ
′′
i ). We therefore have that
Out last(h)(τ−i ◦h, σi ◦h) is winning for player i but Out last(h)(τ−i ◦h, σ
′′
i ◦h) is losing for i from
last(h). Since σ′′i ◦ h = σ
′
i, this means that σ
′
i does not dominate σi ◦ h.
Lemma 4.7. For any integer n, Sn allows shifting.
Proof. The proof is by induction over n. For the case n = 0, the property obviously holds
since all strategies are in S0. Assuming the property holds for n, we show it holds for n+ 1.
Let σ1 and σ2 be two strategies of Sn+1i and h a history compatible with a profile of S
n .
First, if there exists a winning strategy against all profiles of Sn−i, then all strategies of S
n+1
i
are winning strategies. In particular it is the case for both σ1 and σ2. By prefix-independence,
it is also the case for σ1
[
h← σ2
]
, hence σ1
[
h← σ2
]
∈ Sn+1i . Therefore we assume that there
is no winning strategy against all profiles of Sn−i.
Let σ3 ∈ Sni , we show that σ
3 6≻Sn σ
1
[
h← σ2
]
. Without loss of generality, σ3 can be
assumed admissible: σ3 ∈ Sn+1i . Lemma 4.6 ensures that σ
2 ◦ h ∈ Sn+1i and σ
3 ◦ h ∈ Sn+1i .
Since they are both admissible though not winning strategies, there exists a profile τ−i such
that σ2 ◦h wins while σ3 ◦h loses from last(h). Since σ1 and σ3 are also both admissible, there
is also a profile τ ′−i that makes σ
1 win and σ3 lose. Consider now profile τ ′′−i = τ
′
−i [h← τ−i].
We show that ρ = Outh0(τ
′′
−i, σ
3) is losing for player i while ρ′ = Outh0(τ
′′
−i, σ
1
[
h← σ2
]
) is
winning for player i.
If h is not a prefix of the run Outh0(τ
′
−i, σ
3), then this losing outcome is exactly ρ. If h is
a prefix of Outh0(τ
′
−i, σ
3), then ρ = h · Out(τ−i, σ
3 ◦ h) which is a losing outcome, by prefix
independence.
Similarly, if h is not a prefix of Outh0(τ
′
−i, σ
1), then this winning outcome is exactly ρ′.
And if h is a prefix of Outh0(τ
′
−i, σ
1), then ρ′ = h ·Out(τ−i, σ
2 ◦h) which is a winning outcome
for player i, by prefix independence.
4.2 Characterizing outcomes of admissible strategies using the sequence of
their value
Proposition 4.8. For prefix-independent objectives, the value depends only on the last state
of the history.
Proof. Let h, h′ be two different histories with last(h) = last(h′). Assume Valn+1i (h) = 1.
Then i has a strategy σi starting from that wins against all profiles of S
n
−i. Then playing
like σi after h
′, namely switching to σi ◦ h which is a strategy of S
n
i by Lemma 4.6, is still a
winning strategy so Valn+1i (h) = 1.
Assume Valn+1i (h) = −1 and by contradiction that Val
n+1
i (h
′) > −1. Then there exists
a profile σP ∈ S
n such that σP wins from h
′. So playing like σP after h, namely playing
σP ◦ h
′ ∈ Sn, is also winning w.r.t. Wini. Therefore it is not the case that Val
n+1
i (h) = −1.
The case of Valn+1i (h) = 0 is then obtained by definition of value.
Hence we write Valnj (s) instead of Val
n
j (h) when last(h) = s. Since Val
n
j is here a function
from V to {−1, 0, 1}, it can be extended to runs: ValRnj (ρ) is the word w ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
ω such
that wk = Val
n
j (ρk) for all k.
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Lemma 4.9. For all n, if s ∈ Vi, s → s
′ with Valni (s) = Val
n
i (s
′), then for any strategy
σi ∈ S
n+1 that is admissible, the strategy σ′i defined by
σ′i(s) = s
′ σ′i(s · h) = σi(h) σ
′
i(h) = σi(h) if h0 6= s
is also an admissible strategy of Sn+1.
Proof. The case where Valni (s) = 1 (resp. Val
n
i (s) = −1) is trivial since σi is a winning (resp.
always losing) strategy, then so is σ′i.
Otherwise, assume Valni (s) = Val
n
i (s
′) = 0. Let τi ∈ S
n
i . We only consider what happens
in s, since otherwise σ′i behaves the same as σi. If τi(s) = s
′′ 6= s′, then Valni (s
′′) ≤ 0 so there
is a profile that makes τi lose from s
′′ hence from s. Additionally, a profile exists that makes
σi win from s
′, hence it makes σ′i win from s.
If τi(s) = s
′. Since σi is admissible, τi ◦ s 6≻Sn σi.
• If there is a profile that makes σi win but τi ◦ s lose, it also makes σ
′
i win and τi lose.
• Otherwise every profile that makes τi ◦ s win also makes σi win, hence all profiles that
make τi win also make σ
′
i win.
Lemma 4.10. For all integer n and states s, s′ such that s → s′, if s is controlled by i then
Valni (s) ≥ Val
n
i (s
′).
Proof. Assume s is controlled by i:
• if Valni (s
′) = −1 then the property is obviously true.
• if Valni (s
′) = 0 then there exists a strategy profile σP ∈ S
n that makes player i win from
s′. We define the strategy σ′i that plays from s to s
′ and then follows σi:
σ′i(s) = s
′ σ′i(s · h) = σi(h) σ
′
i(h) = σi(h) if h0 6= s
Strategy σ′i is a strategy of S
n
i by Lemma 4.9. The strategy profile σj 6=i [s · s
′ ← σj 6=i]
is in Sn because of Lemma 4.7. The outcome of (σ′i, σj 6=i [s · s
′ ← σj 6=i]) is then winning
from s by prefix independence. The value of s is therefore at least 0.
• if Valni (s
′) = 1 then there exists a strategy σi ∈ S
n
i that is winning for player i from s
′ for
all the strategy profiles in
∏
i 6=j S
n
j . Consider the strategy σ
′
i that plays from s to s
′ and
then follows σi. Let σ
′
j 6=i be a strategy profile in
∏
i 6=j S
n
j . By Lemma 4.6, σ
′
j 6=i ◦ (s · s
′)
is a strategy profile in
∏
i 6=j S
n
j . Strategy σi is winning against σ
′
j 6=i ◦ (s · s
′) from s′
and by prefix independence σ′i is winning against σ
′
j 6=i from s. Therefore the value of s
is 1.
Lemma 4.11. For all n, if s ∈ Vi and σi ∈ S
n+1
i then for any history h, Val
n
i (s) = Val
n
i (σi(h ·
s)).
Proof. By the previous lemma the value cannot increase. If player i plays an admissible
strategy σi ∈ S
n+1
i , we show that it cannot decrease. Let s
′ = σi(h · s)
• If Valni (s) = 1, then σi is a winning strategy. Since there is no such strategy from a state
with value Valni ≤ 0, Val
n
i (s
′) = 1.
• If Valni (s) = 0, then there is a profile σ−i ∈ S
n
−i such that ρ = Out(σi, σ−i) ∈ Wini.
Note that h ·s ·s′<ρ. If Valni (s
′) = −1, there can be no such profile, thus Valni (s
′) > −1,
hence Valni (s
′) = 0
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• If Valni (s) = −1, there can be no lower value so Val
n
i (s
′) = −1.
The following lemma shows that in terms of the sequence of value for a player, we can
distinguish three types of plays that are outcome of admissible strategies.
Lemma 4.12. Let s ∈ V , ρ ∈ Outs(S
n), and i ∈ P .
If ρ ∈ Outs(S
n+1
i ) then ValR
n
i (ρ) ∈ 0
∗1ω + 0ω + 0∗(−1)ω.
Proof. Let ρ be the outcome of a strategy profile σP ∈ S
n and k ≥ 0 be an index.
• If Valni (ρk) = −1 and Val
n
i (ρk+1) ≥ 0. There is a strategy profile σ
′
P in S
n that is winning
for player i from ρk+1. By Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.6, σP ◦ (ρ≤k) [ρk+1 ← σ
′
P ] is in S
n.
It makes player i win from ρk. It is a contradiction with the fact that Val
n
i (ρk) = −1.
• If Valni (ρk) = 1 and Val
n
i (ρk+1) ≤ 0. There is a strategy profile in S
n that makes σi ◦ρ≤k
lose from ρk+1. On the other hand, since Val
n
i (ρk) = 1 there is a strategy σ
′
i that is
winning for player i against any strategy of Sn. Hence σi ◦ ρ≤k is dominated by σ
′
i
with respect to Sn. By Lemma 4.6 this means that σi is dominated. Therefore ρ is not
compatible with a strategy in Sn+1i .
Therefore all the paths compatible with a profile in Sn and a strategy in Sn+1i have value of
the form 0∗1ω + 0ω + 0∗(−1)ω.
Now, we characterize outcomes of admissible strategies according to whether they end with
value 1, −1, or 0. We do so for each player individualy.
Value 1. To be admissible in Sn from a state of value 1, a strategy has to be winning
against all strategies of Sn:
Lemma 4.13. Let s ∈ V , i ∈ P and ρ ∈ Outs(S
n) be such that ValRni (ρ) ∈ 0
∗1ω.
ρ ∈ Outs(S
n+1
i ) if, and only if, ρ ∈Wini.
Proof. We construct σi that follows ρ and if the history deviates from this outcome, revert to
a fixed admissible strategy. Formally, let σai ∈ S
n+1
i , we define σi by:
• if h is a prefix of ρ with last(h) ∈ Vi, then σi(h) = ρ|h|+1, so that we ensure that ρ is
compatible with σi;
• otherwise, let k be the largest index such that h≤k is a prefix of ρ, then σi(h) = σ
a
i (h>k).
We show that σi is not weakly dominated. Let σ
′
P be a strategy profile of S
n whose outcome
ρ′ is winning for player i but such that ρ′′ = Out(σ′−i, σi) is not winning for player i. We show
that some profile in Sn−i makes σ
′
i lose. Consider the first index k such that ρ
′
k 6= ρ
′′
k. The
state ρ′k−1 is controlled by player i.
If Valni (ρ
′
k−1) = 0 then there is a profile τ−i ∈ S
n
−i that makes σ
′
i lose from ρ
′
k. As there
is a profile τ ′−i ∈ S
n
−i that makes σi win from ρ
′′
k, we can combine this two strategy profiles to
obtain one winning for σi and losing for σ
′
i. Namely, the profile τ
c
−i defined by
∀j 6= i, τ cj = σj
[
ρ′k ← τj
] [
ρ′′k ← τ
′
j
]
is by construction such a profile. Therefore, σi is not weakly dominated by σ
′
i.
Otherwise, Valni (ρ
′
k−1) = 1, we show that in fact ρ
′′ is a winning path which is a contra-
diction. If ρ′ = ρ then it is winning by hypothesis. Otherwise there is some point from which
σi plays according to σ
a
i .
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If this point is before index k. Since Valni (ρk−1) = 1 there is a strategy of player i winning
from ρk−1 against all profile in S
n
−i. As σ
a
i is in S
n+1
i , so is σ
a
i ◦ρ≤k−1 by Lemma 4.6. Therefore
σai ◦ ρ≤k−1 should be winning from ρk−1 against all profiles in S
n
−i. Hence ρ
′′ is winning for
player i, which is a contradiction.
Otherwise, let k′ be the index at which σi starts playing according to σ
a
i . As Val
n
i (ρk−1) = 1
and k′ ≥ k, Valni (ρk′−1) = 1. Moreover ρ
′′
k′ is a successor of ρk′−1 which is not controlled by i,
so Val(ρ′′k′) = 1 by Lemma 4.10. Therefore σ
a
i ◦ ρ≤k′−1 should be winning from ρ
′′
k−1 against
all profile in Sn−i. Hence ρ
′′ is winning for player i, which is a contradiction.
This shows that σi is not dominated with respect to S
n.
Reciprocally, assume that σi ∈ S
n+1
i . Let k be a index such that Val
n
i (ρk) = 1. There
is a strategy of player i that is winning from ρk against all strategies of S
n. By Lemma 4.6,
σi ◦ ρ≤k is also in S
n+1
i . Therefore σi ◦ ρ≤k also has to be winning against all strategies of S
n.
As ρ≥k is compatible both with a profile of S
n
i and σi ◦ ρ≤k, it is winning for player i. Hence,
by prefix independence of the objectives, ρ is winning for player i.
Value -1. If the run reaches a state of value −1, then, from there, there is no possibility
of winning, so any strategy is admissible but the state of value −1 must not have been reached
by player i’s fault:
Lemma 4.14. Let s ∈ V , i ∈ P and ρ ∈ Outs(S
n) be such that ValRni (ρ) ∈ 0
∗(−1)ω. Let k
be the index such that Valni (ρk) = 0 ∧Val
n
i (ρk+1) = −1.
ρ ∈ Outs(S
n+1
i ) if and only if, ρk 6∈ Vi.
Proof. We construct a strategy σi that follows ρ and if the history deviates from this outcome,
revert to a fixed admissible strategy, in the same way that we did in Lemma 4.13 for value 1.
We define σi by:
• if h is a prefix of ρ with last(h) ∈ Vi, then σi(h) = ρ|h|+1, so that we ensure that ρ is
compatible with σi;
• otherwise, let k be the biggest index such that h≤k is a prefix of ρ, then σi(h) = σ
a
i (h>k).
We show that σi is not weakly dominated. Note that starting from a state s 6= ρ0 means
σi plays according to an admissible strategy. Hence only the case of plays starting from ρ0
remain to be considered.
Let σ′P be a strategy profile of S
n whose outcome ρ′ is winning for player i but such that
ρ′′ = Outρ0(σ
′
−i, σi) is not winning for player i. Consider the first index k such that ρ
′
k 6= ρ
′′
k.
The state ρ′k−1 = ρ
′′
k−1 is controlled by player i. In order to show that σ
′
i 6≻Sn σi, we build a
profile that makes σ′i lose and σi win.
If Valni (ρ
′
k−1) = −1, then ρ
′ cannot be a winning path, this is a contradiction. Otherwise
Valni (ρ
′
k−1) = 0. Then there is a profile in S
n
−i that makes σ
′
i lose from ρ
′
k.
Now we find a profile that makes σi win from ρ
′′
k.
• If ρ′′≤k−1 is not a prefix of ρ, then σi plays according to an admissible strategy. As
Valni (ρ
′′
k−1) = 0, there is a strategy profile that makes the strategy σi ◦ ρ
′′
≤k win.
• Otherwise, ρ′′≤k−1 is a prefix of ρ. Since ρ
′′
k−1 = ρk−1 is controlled by player i, Val
n
i (ρk) =
Valni (ρk−1) = 0 by hypothesis. Let k
′ be the largest index such that Valni (ρk′) = 0.
Since Valni (ρk′+1) = −1, state ρk′ is not controlled by i. From ρk′ there is a strategy
profile σ′′P that makes σ
a
i win. Note that profile σ
′′
−i deviates from ρ at that point since
Valni (ρk′+1) = −1: σ
′′
−i(ρ≤k′) 6= ρk′+1. As a result, after ρ≤k′ , strategy σi follows σ
a
i .
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Therefore the outcome produced by σ′′−i and σi is winning from ρk′ . So there is also a
profile in Sn−i that makes σi win from ρ
′′
k. Namely:
σ′′′j (h) =
{
ρℓ+1 if h = ρ≤ℓ with ℓ < k
′ and ρℓ ∈ Vj
σ′′j (h) otherwise
We can combine the strategy profile that makes σ′i lose with σ
′′′
−i win to obtain one that is
winning for σi and losing for σ
′
i. Hence σi is not weakly dominated.
Example 4.15. As an illustration of Lemmata 4.13 and 4.14, consider the left game in Figure 6.
Both runs s0 · s1 · s2 · Good
ω
1 and s0 · s1 · s2 · s
ω
3 are outcomes of non dominated strategies of
player 1. Indeed, the play that goes to Good1 is winning and the value of the path that goes
to s3 belongs to 0
∗(−1)ω and the value decreases on a transition by player 2.
Value 0. This case is more involved. From a state of value 0, an admissible strategy of
player i should allow a winning run for player i with the help of other players. We write Hni
for set of states s controlled by a player j 6= i that have at least two successors that (i) have
value 0 or 1 for player i and (ii) have the same value for player j than s after iteration n− 1.
Formally, for n ≥ 0, the “Help!”-states of player i are defined as:
Hni =
⋃
j∈P\{i}


s ∈ Vj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃s′, s′′, s′ 6= s′′
∧ s→ s′ ∧ s→ s′′
∧ Valni (s
′) ≥ 0
∧ Valni (s
′′) ≥ 0
∧ Valn−1j (s) = Val
n−1
j (s
′)
∧ Valn−1j (s) = Val
n−1
j (s
′′)


These states have the following property.
Lemma 4.16. Let s ∈ V , i ∈ P and ρ ∈ Outs(S
n) be such that ValRni (ρ) = 0
ω.
ρ ∈ Outs(S
n+1
i ) if, and only if, ρ ∈Wini or Inf(ρ) ∩H
n
i 6= ∅
Proof sketch. Assume first that there is only a finite number of visits to Hni and that ρ is not
winning for player i. Let k be the greatest index such that ρk ∈ H
n
i . After the prefix ρ≤k
no profile of Sn can make σi win, since no “Help!”-state is visited. While since Val
n
i (ρk) = 0
there is a strategy profile σ′′P of S
n whose outcome is winning for i from ρk. Hence the strategy
that follows σi until the prefix ρ≤k and then switch σ
′′
i weakly dominates σi, and σi 6∈ S
n+1
i .
Assume now that either ρ ∈Wini or there is an infinite number of indexes k such that ρk ∈
Hni . We define a strategy σi that follows ρ when possible and otherwise plays a non-dominated
strategy. Assume that there is a strategy profile σ′P ∈ S
n such that ρ′ = Out(σ′−i, σ
′
i) ∈Wini
and ρ′′ = Out(σ′−i, σi) /∈ Wini. We show that there is a profile that makes σi wins and σ
′
i
lose, so that σ′i does not weakly dominate σi.
For instance in the case where ρ′′ continues to follow ρ after it has diverged from ρ′, we
know it will encounter a “Help!”-state ρk. From there there is a strategy profile σ
d
−i that is
Sn−i thanks to the condition Val
n−1
j (ρk) = Val
n−1(s′′) whith s′′ 6= ρk+1, and which is winning
for σi thanks to the condition Val
n
i (s
′′) ≥ 0, and the fact that σi reverts to a non-dominated
strategy outside of ρ. This strategy profile can moreover be made losing for σ′i from the point
where it deviates from ρ, since this deviation is on a state controled by player i and its value
for player i is 0.
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ρρ′ ρ′′
k
k′
(a) k′ ≥ k
ρ′
ρ′′ ρ
k
k′
(b) k′ < k
Figure 5: Divergence of outcomes by strategy shifting in the proof of Lemma 4.16.
Proof. Assume first that there is only a finite number of visits to Hni and that ρ is not winning
for player i. Let k be the greatest index such that ρk ∈ H
n
i . Let σP ∈ S
n be a profile such
that Out(σP ) = ρ. We will show that the strategy for player i in this profile, namely σi, is
weakly dominated with respect to Sn.
First, we show that after some prefix of ρ no profile of Sn can make σi win. Let α−i ∈ S
n
−i
and consider the profile σ′−i = σ−i [ρ≤k+1 ← α−i] that follows σP until ρk+1. Let ρ
′ the outcome
of (σi, σ
′
−i). If ρ = ρ
′ then σ′−i does not make σi win.
Otherwise, consider k′ the first index where ρk′ 6= ρ
′
k′ , and j the player controlling state
s = ρk′−1 = ρ
′
k′−1; we have that j 6= i. Since σ
′
j ∈ S
n
j , Lemma 4.11 yields that Val
n−1
j (ρ
′
k′) =
Valn−1j (ρ
′
k′−1). Similarly, since σj ∈ S
n
j , we also have Val
n−1
j (ρk′) = Val
n−1
j (ρk′−1). Therefore
Valn−1j (ρk′) = Val
n−1
j (ρ
′
k′) = Val
n−1
j (s). Recall that Val
n
i (ρ) = 0
ω so Valni (ρk′) = 0. Since
ρk′−1 6∈ H
n
i , it must be the case that Val
n
i (ρ
′
k′) = −1. Therefore no strategy profile in
∏
j 6=i S
n
j
makes σi win from ρk+1.
Secondly, since Valni (ρk) = 0 there is a strategy profile σ
′′
P of S
n whose outcome is winning
for i from ρk. Hence σi [ρ≤k ← σ
′′
i ] weakly dominates σi, and σi 6∈ S
n+1
i .
Assume now that either ρ ∈ Wini or there is an infinite number of indexes k such that
ρk ∈ H
n
i . Let αi be a strategy in S
n+1
i . We build σi so that it is compatible with ρ and
revert to αi in case of a deviation. Formally, for a history h, such that last(h) is controlled by
player i:
• if h = ρ≤k for some index k then σi(h) = ρk+1 (this ensures that σi is compatible with
ρ);
• otherwise, let k be the largest index such that ρ≤k is a prefix of h, then σi(h) = αi(h≥k+1).
We now show that σi is not weakly dominated. Assume that there is a strategy profile
σ′P ∈ S
n such that ρ′ = Out(σ′−i, σ
′
i) ∈ Wini and ρ
′′ = Out(σ′−i, σi) /∈ Wini. We show that
there is a profile that makes σi wins and σ
′
i lose, so that σ
′
i does not weakly dominate σi.
We consider the points where ρ′′ diverges from ρ and ρ′, respectively. Formally, let k (resp.
k′) be the largest index such that ρ′′≤k = ρ≤k (resp. ρ
′′
≤k′ = ρ
′
≤k′). We distinguish two cases as
illustrated in Figure 5.
• If k′ ≥ k, i.e. ρ′′ diverges from ρ before diverging from ρ′. Since αi is not weakly
dominated, from ρ′′k+1 there is a strategy profile σ
′′
−i that makes αi win and σ
′
i ◦ ρ
′′
≤k
lose. Hence σ′−i
[
ρ′′≤k′+1 ← σ
′′
−i
]
makes σi win but not σ
′
i. Therefore σ
′
i does not weakly
dominates σi.
• In the other case, k′ < k, the point where the two outcomes diverge is along ρ. We
have ρ≤k′ = ρ
′
≤k′ . We write s = ρ
′
k′ = ρk′ , which is controlled by j 6= i, s
′ = ρ′k′+1, and
19
s′′ = ρk′+1 = σi(ρ≤k′) = ρ
′′
k′+1. Notice that Val
n
j (s
′) ≤ 0 because Valni (s) = 0 and using
Lemma 4.10. Hence there is a strategy profile σℓ−i in S
n that makes σ′i lose from s
′.
– If ρ is a winning outcome for player i, we consider the strategy profile:
σ′−i
[
ρ′≤k′+1 ← σ
ℓ
−i
]
[ρ≤k′+1 ← σ−i ◦ ρ≤k′+1] .
Combined with σi, its outcome is ρ and therefore is winning. This strategy profile
belongs to Sn by Lemma 4.7 and makes σi win and σ
′
i lose, hence σ
′
i does not
weakly dominates σi.
– Otherwise, there is an infinite number of states in Hni along ρ. Let k
′′ be the index
of the first occurrence of Hni after the divergence: the smallest k
′′ > k′ such that
ρk′′ ∈ H
n
i . State ρk′′ is controlled by a player j 6= i. We consider a strategy profile
σdP such that:
∗ σdj (ρk′′) = s
d such that sd 6= ρk′′+1, with Val
n
i (s) ≥ 0, and Val
n−1
j (ρk′′) =
Valn−1j (s
d). This state exists since ρk′′ ∈ H
n
i .
∗ Then from sd it follows a strategy profile σ′′−i ∈ S
n
−i that makes αi win. This
profile exists since αi ∈ S
n+1
i and Val
n
i (s
d) ≥ 0.
The profile σdP belongs to S
n
−i. Indeed, all players but j play according to a strategy
of Sn−i by construction. In the case of player j, it first involves a step that does not
change the value Valn−1j , so by Lemma 4.9, it is also admissible.
We consider the strategy profile:
σ′−i
[
ρ′≤k′+1 ← σ
ℓ
−i
] [
ρ≤k′′ ← σ
d
−i
]
.
This strategy profile belongs to Sn by Lemma 4.7 and makes σi win and σ
′
i lose,
hence σ′i does not weakly dominates σi.
This shows that σi is not weakly dominated and belongs to S
n+1
i .
s0 s1 s2
Good 1 s3
(a) A first reachability game
s0 s1 s2
s4
Good 1 s3
(b) A second reachability game
Figure 6: Two games. The goal for player 1 is to reach Good 1.
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Example 4.17. As an illustration of Lemma 4.16, consider the two games in Figure 6. In the
game of Figure 6(a), a strategy of player 1 that stays in the loop (s0 · s1) forever is weakly
dominated. The value of this run is 0ω and visits no “Help!”-state, since in that game H01 = ∅.
Intuitively, the strategy is dominated because it has no chance of winning, while getting out
after k steps can be winning if player 2 helps.
However, in the game of Figure 6(b), the strategy that always chooses s4 from s1 is
admissible. The run (s0 · s1 · s4)
ω also has value 0ω, but this time H01 = {s4}, which is visited
infinitely often by the loop.
4.3 Automata for Out(Sn)
Our goal is to obtain an automaton which recognizes Out(Sn). We decompose this construc-
tion for each player by noting that:
Out(Sn−1) ∩
⋂
i∈P
Out(Sn−1−i ,S
n
i ) = Out(S
n)
From the characterization of admissible strategies w.r.t. values of state, we define an automa-
ton Ani that selects Out(S
n
i ) within Out(S
n−1), i.e. such that L(Ani ) ∩Out(S
n−1) is equal to
Out(Sni ,S
n−1
−i ). This construction rely on values at previous iterations. For n > 0, A
n
i is the
automaton where:
• The set of states is V , i.e. the same states as in G;
• From the transitions in G we remove those controlled by player i that decrease his value.
Formally:
T = E \ {(s, s′) | s ∈ Vi ∧Val
n−1
i (s) > Val
n−1
i (s
′)}.
• A run ρ is accepted by Ani if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. ValRn−1i (ρ) ∈ 0
∗(−1)ω;
2. ValRn−1i (ρ) ∈ 0
∗1ω and ρ ∈Wini;
3. ValRn−1i (ρ) ∈ 0
ω and ρ ∈Wini or ρ ∈ (V
∗Hn−1i )
ω.
Note that the structure of the automaton is a subgame of G. Since the transitions of G
bear no label, the “language” L(A) of an automaton A is here considered to be the set of
accepting runs. The following lemma shows the relation between automaton Ani and outcomes
of admissible strategies at step n.
Lemma 4.18. Out(Sn−1) ∩ L(Ani ) = Out(S
n
i ,S
n−1
−i )
Proof. Let ρ be the outcome of a strategy profile in Sn−1 that is also accepted by Ani . Note
that proving that ρ ∈ Out(Sni ) suffices to prove that ρ ∈ Out(S
n
i ,S
n−1
−i ).
There are three different cases, depending on which part of the accepting condition of Ani
is fulfilled.
• If ValRn−1i (ρ) ∈ 0
∗1ω, then ρ ∈Wini, so Lemma 4.13 yields that ρ ∈ Out(S
n
i ).
• If ValRn−1i (ρ) ∈ 0
∗(−1)ω, the definition of T ensures that for any index k such that
ρk ∈ Vi, ValR
n−1
i (ρk) = ValR
n−1
i (ρk+1). Thus Lemma 4.14 yields that ρ ∈ Out(S
n
i ).
• Otherwise ValRn−1i (ρ) ∈ 0
ω, and ρ ∈ Wini or there is an infinite number of visits to
Hn−1i . Then Lemma 4.16 allows to conclude.
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Reciprocally, let ρ ∈ Out(Sni ,S
n−1
−i ). By monotonicity of the sets of admissible strategies,
ρ ∈ Out(Sn−1), so it remains to be proven that ρ ∈ L(Ani ). Notice that since ρ ∈ Out(S
n),
ρ /∈ Bni , so ρ is actually a run of A
n
i .
Now by Lemma 4.12, we can consider the three following cases for Valn−1i (ρ).
• If ValRn−1i (ρ) ∈ 0
∗(−1)ω, then ρ ∈ L(Ani ).
• If ValRn−1i (ρ) ∈ 0
∗1ω. Let us write ρ = Out(σi, σ−i) with σi ∈ S
n
i and σ−i ∈ S
n−1
−i .
Let s be the first state of value 1 encountered in ρ. From s there exists a strategy σwi
for player i winning against all other strategy profiles of Sn−1−i . Therefore if σi is not
a winning strategy, σwi ≻Sn−1 σi, which is a contradiction with the fact that σi ∈ S
n
i .
Thus σi is a winning strategy so ρ ∈Wini and therefore ρ ∈ L(A
n
i ).
• Otherwise ValRn−1i (ρ) ∈ 0
ω and Lemma 4.16 allows to conclude that either ρ ∈Wini or
ρ ∈ (V ∗Hn−1i )
ω, therefore that ρ ∈ L(Ani ).
The following property is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.18.
Lemma 4.19. Out(Sn−1) ∩
⋂
i∈P L(A
n
i ) = Out(S
n)
Proof.
Out(Sn−1) ∩
⋂
i∈P
L(Ani ) =
⋂
i∈P
(L(Ani ) ∩Out(S
n−1))
=
⋂
i∈P
(Out(Sni ) ∩Out(S
n−1))
(by Lemma 4.18)
=
(⋂
i∈P
Out(Sni )
)
∩Out(Sn−1)
= Out(Sn) ∩Out(Sn−1)
Out(Sn−1) ∩
⋂
i∈P
L(Ani ) = Out(S
n) because Sn ⊆ Sn−1
As Out(S0) is the set of all runs over G, the previous lemma allows the construction of
Out(Sn) by induction, for any n. Note that the size of the automaton accepting Out(Sn)
does not grow since all automata in the intersection share the same structure as G (although
some edges have been removed). The accepting condition, however, becomes more and more
complex. Nonetheless, if for all j ∈ P , Winj is a Muller condition given by a Boolean circuit,
the condition of the automaton accepting Out(Sn) is a Boolean combination of such condi-
tions, thus it is expressible by a Boolean circuit, of polynomial size. For example, condition
ValRn−1i (ρ) ∈ 0
∗1ω can be expressed by a circuit that is the disjunction of all states of value
1 at step n− 1.
4.4 Inductive computation of values
Now, we show how to compute the values of the states for all players. Initially, at “iteration
−1”, all values are assumed to be 0, and S−1 = S. Computing the values at the next iteration
relies on solving two-player zero-sum games with objectives based on outcomes of admissible
strategies. For example, in order to decide whether a state s has value 1 for player i at
iteration 0, i.e. whether Val0i (s) = 1, one must decide whether player i has a winning strategy
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from s when playing against all other players. This corresponds to the game with winning
condition Wini where vertices of all players but i belong to a single opponent. To decide
whether Val0i (s) > −1, all players try together to make i win. Therefore this is a one-player
game (or emptiness check) on G with condition Wini. All the other states have value −1.
This idea is extended to subsequent iterations, but the objectives of the games become
more complex in order to take into account the previous iterations: the objectives need to
enforce that only outcomes of admissible strategies (at previous iterations) are played. Hence
the construction relies on the automata Ani built above. Assuming that winning conditions
for all players are Muller conditions, this yields a polynomial space algorithm to compute the
values.
In the sequel, a strategy or an outcome “winning for objective X” is said X-winning, as
not to confuse with simply winning, meaning “winning for objective Wini” (i being usually
clear from context).
4.4.1 Characterizing states of value -1
A state s has a value > −1 for player i at step n if there is a strategy profile σP ∈ S
n s.t.
Outs(σP ) ∈Wini. This is expressed by: ∃σP ∈ S. σP ∈ S
n ∧Outs(σP ) ∈Wini. This prompts
the definition of the following objective:
Ψni (s) = Outs(S
n) ∩Wini.
Lemma 4.20. If Ψni (s) 6= ∅, then ∃σP ∈ S
n : Outs(σP ) ∈Wini.
Therefore, since the set Outs(S
n) and Wini can both be expressed as the language of an
automaton, testing whether a state has value −1 boils down to check emptiness.
4.4.2 Characterizing states of value 1
A state s has value 1 for player i at step n if he has a strategy σi in S
n
i such that for all
strategies σ−i in S
n
−i, Outs(σi, σ−i) ∈Wini. This is expressed by the formula:
∃σi ∈ Si, ∀σ−i ∈ S−i,
(
σi ∈ S
n
i ∧
(
σ−i ∈ S
n
−i ⇒Win
s
i (σi, σ−i)
))
.
This prompts the definition of the following objective:
Ωni (s) = Outs(S
n
i ) ∩ (Outs(S
n)⇒Wini) .
We show that there is indeed a correspondence between this objective Ωni and states s such
that Valni (s) = 1.
Lemma 4.21. If σi ∈ Si is a Ω
n
i (s)-winning strategy, then there exists σ
′
i ∈ S
n
i such that
σi(s · h) = σ
′
i(s · h) for any history h.
Proof. Let σ0i ∈ S
n
i . We show that for runs starting from s, σi is admissible. That directly
yields the result with σ′i = σ
0
i [s← σi].
We only consider runs starting in state s. We show that σi is not strictly dominated
with respect to Sn−1. Assume there exists a strategy profile σ′P ∈ S
n−1 whose outcome ρ′ is
winning for player i, but such that ρ = Outs(σi, σ
′
−i) is not winning for player i. Let k be
the first index where ρk 6= ρ
′
k. By hypothesis that σi is Ω
n
i -winning, ρ ∈ Outs(S
n
i ) and is
the outcome of an admissible strategy αi ∈ S
n
i . Note that ρ = Outs(αi, σ
′
−i) and is losing,
while ρ′ = Outs(σ
′
i, σ
′
−i) is winning, with σ
′
−i ∈ S
n−1
−i , so αi 6<Sn−1 σ
′
i. By admissibility of αi,
σ′i 6≻Sn−1 αi, therefore σ
′
i 6<Sn−1 αi. Hence there exists σ
′′
−i ∈ S
n−1 that makes σ′i lose from
ρ′k.
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Now, σi is winning for objective Ω
n
i , and since ρ≤k is compatible with σi, it is Ω
n
i -winning
from ρk. In particular, if all players j 6= i play according to a strategy of S
n
−i it is winning.
Since the condition V ω \Outs(S
n
−i) cannot be satisfied, condition Wini is satisfied. Therefore
the strategy profile σ′′−i ∈ S
n−1 makes σi win. Recall that σ
′′
−i also makes σ
′
i lose from ρ
′
k.
Hence σi is not strictly dominated with respect to S
n−1
i and it belongs to S
n
i .
Proposition 4.22. A strategy of player i is a strategy of Sni which is winning from state s
against all strategies of Sn−i if, and only if, it is winning for objective Ω
n
i (s).
Proof. Assume σi is a strategy of S
n
i which is winning from s against all strategies of S
n
−i.
Consider a strategy profile σ−i and the run they produce: ρ = Outs(σi, σ−i). Obviously
ρ ∈ Outs(S
n
i ) because σi ∈ S
n
i . If ρ ∈ Outs
(
Sn−i
)
, as σi is winning against the strategies of
Sn−i this means that ρ is winning for player i. Hence either ρ ∈Wini or ρ ∈ V
ω \Outs
(
Sn−i
)
.
So σi wins for condition Ω
n
i .
Reciprocally, let σi be winning for Ω
n
i (s). Lemma 4.21 shows that σi can be completed
as a strategy of Sni when starting from states other than s. We now show that it is winning
from s against all strategies of Sn−i. Let σ−i ∈ S
n
−i and ρ = Outs(σi, σ−i). The path ρ is in
Outs(S
n
−i), so since σi is winning for Ω
n
i , it means that ρ ∈Wini. Hence σi is winning from s
against all strategies of Sn−i.
Note that we cannot directly obtain a description of Ωni (s) in term of automata using
Lemma 4.18, since we need to recognize Outs(S
n
i ). To characterize runs of Outs(S
n
i ) we will
both use a condition on transition similar to the safety case, and a condition on the long run.
Recall that T n = ∪i∈PT
n
i , where:
T ni = {(s, s
′) ∈ E | s ∈ Vi ∧Val
n−1
i (ρk+1) < Val
n−1
i (ρk)}.
If a player j 6= i takes a transition that decreases its value, then we immediately know
that player i wins for objective Ωni by playing an admissible strategy. We thus define:
Cni = {ρ ∈ V
ω | ∃k, ∃j 6= i, (ρk, ρk+1) ∈ T
n
j };
We also define C≤ni =
⋃n
m=1 C
m
i and Out(G \ T
≤n) =
⋂n
m=1Out(G \ T
n). And similarly the
sets Bni and B
≤n
i =
⋃n
m=1B
m
i by:
Bni = {ρ ∈ V
ω | ∃k. ρk ∈ Vi,Val
n−1
i (ρk+1) < Val
n−1
i (ρk)};
Lemma 4.23. For any player i and iteration n, the following implications hold:
(1) If ρ ∈ Out(Sni ), then ρ /∈ B
≤n
i .
(2) If ρ ∈ Out(Sn−i), then ρ /∈ C
≤n
i .
(3) If ρ ∈ Out(Sn), then ρ ∈ Out(G \ T n).
Proof. Since Out(Sn−1i ) ⊆ Out(S
n
i ), it is sufficient to prove the following.
(1’) If ρ ∈ Out(Sni ), then ρ /∈ B
n
i .
(2’) If ρ ∈ Out(Sn−i), then ρ /∈ C
n
i .
Implication (1’) holds because of Lemma 4.11. Implication (2’) is obtained by applying the
same lemma to players j 6= i. Implication (3) is a consequence of (1) and (2).
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Objective Ωni can be further decomposed with respect to C
n
i and T
n.
Proposition 4.24. Player i, has a winning strategy for Ωni (s) in G if, and only, if he has one
for:
Θni (s) = C
≤n
i ∪
(
Out(G \ T≤n) ∩Ωni (s)
)
.
Proof. Objective Θni can be rewritten
Θni (s) = C
≤n
i ∪
(
(V ω \B≤ni ) ∩ (V
ω \ C≤ni ) ∩ Ω
n
i (s)
)
.
Let σi be a Ω
n
i (s)-winning strategy. Let ρ ∈ Outs(σi). Note that since σi is Ω
n
i (s)-winning,
player i never decreases his value in ρ, therefore ρ ∈ (V ω \B≤ni ). Therefore
• either ρ ∈ C≤ni ⊆ Θ
n
i ,
• or ρ ∈ V ω \ C≤ni , then ρ ∈ (V
ω \B≤ni ) ∩ (V
ω \ C≤ni ) ∩ Ω
n
i (s) ⊆ Θ
n
i (s).
Therefore a σi is also winning for Θ
n
i .
Reciprocally, if σi is winning for Θ
n
i (s). We build a Ω
n
i (s)-winning strategy σ
′
i as follows.
Let αi ∈ S
n
i be an admissible strategy for player i. We set σ
′
i that plays like σi until a player
j 6= i decreases his value, then plays like αi.
Note that σi never decreases the value for i before shifting to αi. Indeed, assume against a
profile σ−i, player i decreases his value after a history h (where no other player has decreased
his own value). Let σ′−i be a (positional) profile that never decrease a value for j 6= i at any
iteration and ρ = Outs(σi, σ−i [h← σ
′
i]). Then ρ /∈ C
≤n
i while ρ ∈ B
n
i ⊆ B
≤n
i , so ρ /∈ Θ
n
i ,
which is a contradiction with the fact that σi is Θ
n
i -winning.
As a result, applying Lemma 4.9 several (but a finite number of) times yields that σ′i is
admissible. So every run produced by σ′i starting from s is by definition in Outs(S
n
i ). Also
remark that σ′i is a Θ
n
i (s)-winning strategy.
Let σ−i be a profile and let ρ = Outs(σ
′
i, σ−i). If for some j 6= i, ρ /∈ Outs(S
n
j ), then
ρ ∈ Ωni (s) because ρ /∈ Outs(S
n
−i). Otherwise, by Lemma 4.23, ρ /∈ C
≤n
i thus ρ ∈ Ω
n
i (s).
4.4.3 Using the automata
We can now use the acceptance conditions of automata (Amj )m≤n,j∈P to rewrite Θ
n
i . If we
expand the definition of Ωni in Θ
n
i , we obtain that Θ
n
i (s) equals:
C≤ni ∪
(
Out(G \ T≤n) ∩Outs(S
n
i ) ∩ (Outs(S
n)⇒Wini)
)
.
The set C≤ni and Wini are easily definable by an automaton. An automata for Out(S
n)
is constructed through an intersection of automata (Amj )m≤n,j∈P , as shown in Lemma 4.19.
Hence, we now have to construct automata recognizing and Out(Sni ) ∩Out(G \ T
≤n).
Computing Out(Sni )∩Out(G \T
≤n). This construction is also based on the automaton
Ani . For this, we show that it can be defined through a combination of Out(S
n
i ,S
n−1
−i ) and of
outcomes of admissible strategies at the previous iteration. Namely:
Lemma 4.25.
Out(Sni ) ∩Out(G \ T
≤n) = Out(Sn−1i ) ∩Out(G \ T
≤n)
∩
(
Out(Sn−1)⇒ Out(Sni ,S
n−1
−i )
)
.
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Proof. ⊆ The inclusion holds because Sni ⊆ S
n−1
i and
Out(Sni ) ∩Out(S
n−1) = Out(Sni ,S
n−1
−i ).
⊇ In the other direction, let ρ be such that
ρ ∈ Out(G \ T≤n) ∩Out(Sn−1i ) ∩
(
Out(Sn−1)⇒ Out(Sni ,S
n−1
−i )
)
.
If ρ is an outcome of Sn−1 then it is an outcome of (Sni ,S
n−1
−i ) and therefore in Out(S
n
i ).
Otherwise, ρ is in Out(Sn−1i ) \ Out(S
n−1). Let αi be a strategy of S
n
i , we define σi that
follows ρ and revert to αi if the history deviates from ρ. Formally, for a history h, such that
last(h) ∈ Vi:
• if there is k such that h = ρ≤k, then σi(h) = ρk+1; this is to ensure that ρ is an outcome
of σi;
• otherwise let k be the last index such that ρ≤k is a prefix of h, then σi(h) = αi(h>k).
Note that Out(σi) ∩B
n
i = ∅. Indeed, the only outcome of σi which might not be in Out(S
n
i )
is ρ which does not belong to Bni by assumption.
We show that σi is in S
n
i . Assume there is a strategy profile σ
′
P ∈ S
n−1 whose outcome ρ′
is winning for player i but such that ρ′′ = Out(σi, σ
′
−i) is not. The path ρ
′′ is different from ρ
since it belongs to Out(Sn−1).
However, as noted before, ρ′′ /∈ Bni . Let k (resp. k
′) be the first index where ρ′′ differs
from ρ (resp. ρ′). We distinguish two cases, once again as in Figure 5. If k′ ≥ k, σi is playing
according to a non-dominated strategy from ρ≤k+1, hence it is not strictly dominated by σ
′
i.
Otherwise, k′ < k. Let s = ρ′′k′ , it is controlled by player i. Let s
′ = σ′i(ρ≤k′), and
s′′ = σi(ρ≤k′). Note that since ρ /∈ B
n
i , Val
n−1
i (s) = Val
n−1
i (s
′′). Additionally, if Valn−1i (s) >
Valn−1i (s
′), then a profile that fares better for σi than for σ
′
i can easily be found, so σ
′
i 6≻Sn−1 σi.
Therefore we assume Valn−1i (s) = Val
n−1
i (s
′) and distinguish cases according to the three
possible values.
• If Valn−1i (s) = −1, then it is not possible for σ
′
P to be winning, hence a contradiction.
• If Valn−1i (s) = 1. First assume that Val
n−1
i (ρ
′′
k+1) = 1. Then, since σi plays according
to a strategy of Sni after ρ
′′
≥k+1, ρ
′′ is a winning path. This contradicts our hypothesis.
Otherwise, consider the first state of ρ′′≥k′ that does not have value 1: the smallest k
′′ > k′
such Valn−1i (ρ
′′
k′′) < 1. As a result, and since ρ
′′ /∈ Bni , ρ
′′
k′′ = ρk′′ ∈ Vj for some j 6= i.
Since ρ 6∈ Cni , Val
n−1
j (ρ
′′
k′′) = Val
n−1
j (ρ
′′
k′′−1). By Lemma 4.9, from the strategy of S
n−1
−i
from ρ′′k′′ that makes player i lose, we can construct another one that makes player i lose
from ρ′′k′′−1. This contradicts the fact that Val
n−1
i (ρ
′′
k′′−1) = 1.
• If Valn−1i (s) = 0. Then one can find a profile that makes σ
′
i lose. First assume that
Valn−1i (ρ
′′
k+1) ≥ 0. Then a profile can be found that makes σi win, since σi plays
according to an admissible strategy from that point.
Otherwise, consider the step in which a player j 6= i decreases Valn−1i : the smallest
k′′ > k′ such Valn−1i (ρk′′+1) = −1. We have that ρk′′ ∈ Vj for some j 6= i. Since
Valn−1i (ρk′′) = 0, there exists a successor state of ρk′′ of the same value for player j
that is of value ≥ 0 for player i: a state q 6= ρk′′+1 such that ρk′′ → q, Val
n−1
i (q) ≥ 0,
and Valn−1j (ρk′′) = Val
n−1
j (q). Then from q there is a profile σ
′′
−i ∈ S
n−1
−i that makes σi
win, since σi plays according to an admissible strategy from that point. Notice that the
profile that plays like σ′−i up to ρk′′ then goes to q and shifts to σ
′′
−i is still a profile of
Sn−1−i .
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Hence σi is admissible and ρ ∈ Out(S
n
i ), which concludes the proof.
Lemma 4.26. Out(Sni ) ∩Out(G \ T
≤n) is equal to:
Out(Sn−1i ) ∩Out(G \ T
≤n−1)i ∩
(
Out(Sn−1)⇒ L(Ani )
)
∩Out(G \ T≤n).
Proof. Remark that B≤ni = B
n
i ∪B
≤n−1
i and C
≤n
i = C
n
i ∪ C
≤n−1
i , so
Out(G \ T n) = V ω \ (B≤ni ∪ C
≤n
i )
= V ω \ (Bni ∪B
≤n−1
i ∪ C
n
i ∪C
≤n−1
i )
=
(
V ω \ (B≤n−1i ∪ C
≤n−1
i )
)
∩ (V ω \Bni ) ∩ (V
ω \ Cni )
Out(G \ T n) = Out(G \ T n−1)i ∩ (V
ω \Bni ) ∩ (V
ω \ Cni ) . (1)
In addition, Out(Sni ,S
n−1
−i ) = Out(S
n−1) ∩ L(Ani ), so
Out(Sn−1) ⇒ Out(Sni ,S
n−1
−i ) = Out(S
n−1)⇒
(
Out(Sn−1) ∩ L(Ani )
)
Out(Sn−1) ⇒ Out(Sni ,S
n−1
−i ) = Out(S
n−1)⇒ L(Ani ). (2)
Rewriting Lemma 4.25 with Equations (1) and (2) yields the result.
The previous lemma provides a recurrence relation to compute the intersection Out(Sni )∩
Out(G \ T n), with base case being all the runs of G.
4.5 Bounding the number of iteration phases
We can show that Valni (s) = 1 ⇒ Val
n+1
i (s) = 1 as winning strategies are admissible and
Sn+1−i ⊆ S
n
−i implies that winning strategies remain winning. Similarly, we can show Val
n
i (s) =
−1 ⇒ Valn+1i (s) = −1. So the number of times that the value function changes is bounded
by |P | · |V |. This allows us to bound the number of iterations necessary to reach the fix-point:
Proposition 4.27. S∗ = S |P |·|V |.
Proof. Since Sn+1 ⊂ Sn, a state that has value 6= 0 at a given iteration cannot change its
value at a subsequent iteration. Hence there are at most |P | · |V | changes of value during the
iteration process. Since admissible strategies depend only on the values (even through the
“Help!”-states), the strategy elimination stops when the value stops changing.
4.6 Algorithm for Muller conditions
The above construction yields procedures to compute the values, and in turn to solve the win-
ning coalition problem. The algorithm works as follow, starting from n = 0 and incrementing
it at each loop:
1. compute an automaton representing Out(Sn) with the help of L(An), as described in
Section 4.3;
2. compute for each player i the objective Θni as explained in Section 4.4.3;
3. compute for each player i the objective Ψni (see Section 4.4.1);
4. compute for each player i and state s, Valni (s): we will show how to do this in the
remainder of this section;
5. compute for each player i the set Hni .
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Proposition 4.28. Checking whether Valni (s) = 1 is in PSPACE.
Proof. We define the following two-player game Gni as follows. G
n
i has the structure of G,
except that the edges corresponding to a player decreasing his own value at any previous
iteration have been removed (thus avoiding T≤n syntactically). The players are Eve and Adam,
the states of Eve are Vi and the states of Adam are
⋃
j 6=i Vj . The winning condition for Eve is
Θni , which is a Muller condition.
If Eve has a winning strategy starting from state s, then Valni (s) = 1, as shown by Proposi-
tions 4.22 and 4.24. Recall that for Muller condition, deciding whether there exists a winning
strategy for Eve is in PSPACE [20].
Proposition 4.29. Checking whether Valni (s) = −1 is in coNP.
Proof. This is equivalent to the emptiness of Ψni when starting from state s. Again, Ψ
n
i
is a circuit condition on G where edges decreasing the value of their owner are removed.
Testing non-emptiness amounts to guessing a lasso path starting from s, and checking that
the states visited infinitely often correspond to a set of F . This NP algorithm answers true
when Valni (s) 6= −1. We therefore have a coNP algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let W,L be the set of players that must win and lose, respectively,
in the instance of the winning coalition problem. The winning coalition problem is thus
equivalent to the non-emptiness of
Φ = Out(S∗) ∩
⋂
i∈W
Wini ∩
⋂
i∈L
¬Wini
over G, which is a Muller condition. This check is done in NP.
This however requires the computation of the condition corresponding to Out(S∗), hence
of the values for all intermediate iterations before the fix-point. Each iteration means solving
a Muller game, which is done in polynomial space. Moreover, by Proposition 4.27, there are
at most |P | · |V | iterations. Thus the overall complexity is in PSPACE.
4.7 Bu¨chi objectives
In this section, We assume that each winning condition Wini is given by a Bu¨chi set Fi. A
careful analysis of condition Θni shows that it can be reformulated as a parity condition. Hence
computing the value of a state boils down to solving two-player parity games. Parity games
are known to be in UP ∩ coUP, but the question whether a polynomial algorithm exists for
parity games has been open for several years [22, 6]. Our algorithm thus works in polynomial
time with call to oracles in NP∩ coNP, hence is also in NP ∩ coNP [23]. This idea is the basis
for the proof of Theorem 4.2, which is detailed in the remainder of the section.
Definition 4.30. A parity condition is given by a coloring function χ : V → {0, . . . ,M} with
M ∈ N. Accepted runs with respect to the coloring functions are the ones where the maximal
color visited infinitely often is even:
Winχ = {ρ |max(Inf(χ(ρ))) is even} .
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4.7.1 Expressing Θi as a parity condition
First note that the acceptance condition of L(Ani ) can be expressed by the following Bu¨chi
set, assuming that we remove all the edges that decrease the value of player i:
Kni ={s | Val
n−1
i (s) = −1} ∪ {s | Val
n−1
i (s) = 1 ∧ s ∈ Fi}
∪ {s | Valn−1i (s) = 0 ∧ s ∈ (Fi ∪H
n−1
i )}
Note that Fi ⊆ K
n
i for every n.
Out(S0) is accepted by the automaton with the same structure as G and where the Bu¨chi
set is V . Since Out(Sn−1) ∩
⋂
i∈P L(A
n
i ) = Out(S
n) by Lemma 4.19, Out(Sn) is recognized
by an automaton whose acceptance condition is a conjunction of n×|P | Bu¨chi conditions. By
taking a product of the game with an automaton of size n× |P |, a condition Out(Sn) can be
expressed as a single Bu¨chi set that we write Dn.
Recall that condition Θni is
C≤ni ∪
(
Out(G \ T n−1) ∩Out(Sni ) ∩ (Out(S
n)⇒Wini)
)
.
We isolate the prefix-independent part of Θni by defining
Γni = Out(S
n
i ) ∩ (Out(S
n)⇒Wini)
which, by unfolding the recurrence relation of Lemma 4.26, can be rewritten:
Γni =
n−1⋂
m=0
(
Out(Sm)⇒
(
L(Am+1i ) ∩Out(S
m)
))
∩ (Out(Sn)⇒Wini)
Also remark that the “prefix-dependent” part of Θni can be expressed by either removing edges
(to avoid sets T ni ) or adding an additional winning state (for sets Ci).
Each setOut(Sm) is expressed by the Bu¨chi conditionDm. Similarly, condition
(
L(Am+1i ) ∩Out(S
m)
)
is a conjunction of m× |P |+1 Bu¨chi conditions. Therefore, in order to consider all these dif-
ferent conditions on the same game, it can be assumed that G is synchronized with a product
of size5 O(n2 · |P |). Then each condition
(
L(Am+1i ) ∩Out(S
m)
)
can be expressed as a single
Bu¨chi set that we write Em+1i .
Notice that we have a “chain” of inclusion of the various objectives. For each index m and
player i:
Out(Sm) ∩ L(Am+1i ) ⊆ Out(S
m) ⊆ Out(Sm−1) ∩ L(Ami ). (3)
Hence, if the left operand of an implication Out(Sm) ⇒
(
Out(Sm) ∩ L(Am+1i )
)
is satisfied,
then all such implications are satisfied for indexes k < m. And if the right operand is satisfied,
then it is the case for indexes k ≤ m. The condition Γni can then be defined by the parity
condition given by the following coloring function χni :
• if s ∈ Fi then χ
n
i (s) = 2n + 2
• otherwise χni (s) is the maximum value between 0,
2·max {m | s ∈ Emi }, and 2·max {m | s ∈ D
m}+1, with the convention that max ∅ = −∞.
Lemma 4.31. For all index n and player i, ρ ∈ Γni if, and only if, ρ satisfies the parity
condition χni .
5Precisely |P | · (n− 1) · (n− 2) + n.
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Proof. Assume ρ ∈ Γni . Let m ≤ n be the largest index such that ρ ∈ Out(S
m).
If m = n then ρ ∈ Wini, therefore Fi is visited infinitely often by ρ. The highest color
visited infinitely often is thus 2n+ 2 and ρ satisfies condition χni .
If m < n then ρ is not in Out(Sm+1) and therefore, for m′ > m, not in Out(Sm
′
). Hence
ρ does not visit infinitely often odd colors greater than 2m + 2. Moreover, since ρ ∈ Γni ,
ρ ∈ Out(Sm) ∩ L(Am+1i ) hence it visits infinitely often states of E
m+1
i , which have an even
color of (at least) 2m+ 2. This means that ρ satisfies condition χni .
Reciprocally, assume that ρ satisfies χni . Let c be the highest color that is reached infinitely
often.
If c = 2n + 2 then Fi is visited infinitely often, therefore ρ ∈ Wini. Moreover, for every
m ≤ n, Fi ⊆ K
m
i so K
m
i is also visited infinitely often, hence ρ ∈ L(A
m+1
i ) ⊆ Out(S
m) ⇒(
Out(Sm) ∩ L(Am+1i )
)
, therefore ρ ∈ Γni .
Otherwise c = 2m + 2 with m < n. Then set Em+1i is visited infinitely often while, for
every m′ > m, the set Dm
′
is not. So for m′ > m, ρ is not in Out(Sm
′
), hence all implications
are satisfied of index > m. Note that it is also the case for m′ = n, so ρ ∈ Out(Sn)⇒Wini.
Moreover, since ρ ∈ Out(Sm) ∩ L(Am+1i ), for all indexes m
′ ≤ m, Equation (3) yields
that ρ ∈ Out(Sm
′
) ∩ L(Am
′+1
i . So the implication Out(S
m′) ⇒
(
Out(Sm
′
) ∩ L(Am
′+1
i )
)
is
satisfied. Therefore ρ ∈ Γni .
4.7.2 Solving the winning coalition problem for Bu¨chi objectives
We showed that all objectives encountered in the computation of values boil down to parity
objectives. This yields the following proof:
Proof of Theorem 4.2. By reformulating Θni as a parity condition, checking whether the value
of a state is 1 amounts to solving a two player game with parity condition. This is known to
be in UP ∩ coUP, although suspected to be in P. Similarly, condition Ψni is a conjunction of
Bu¨chi objectives, hence solving its emptiness — which means deciding whether the value of a
state is −1 — is in P.
Let n0 be the index where the sets of admissible strategies stabilize (we have n0 ≤ |P |·|V |).
Let W,L be the set of players that should win and lose, respectively. Solving the winning
coalition problem amounts to solving emptiness of
Φ = Out(Sn0) ∩
⋂
i∈W
Wini ∩
⋂
i∈L
¬Wini.
As the conjunction of n0+ |W | Bu¨chi conditions and a coBu¨chi condition, it can be expressed
as a parity condition with 3 colors.
4.8 Model-checking under admissibility
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Given a LTL formula φ, the model-checking under admissibility problem is equivalent to
the emptiness of Φ = L(¬φ)∩Out(S∗). It was proven in [24] that the language L(¬φ) can be
represented by a Bu¨chi deterministic automaton A with set of states Q such that:
• the size of each state of A is polynomial in |φ|;
• it can be checked if a state is initial in space polynomial in |φ|;
• it can be checked if a state is in F in space polynomial in |φ|;
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• each transition of A can be checked in space polynomial in |φ|.
Lemma 4.32. Let A be an automaton, then for any run ρ of the automaton, there exists π
and τ such that:
• ρ′ = π · τω is a run of A;
• Occ(ρ′) = Occ(ρ);
• Inf(ρ′) = Inf(ρ);
• |π|+ |τ | ≤ 2 · n2 where n is the number of states of A.
The proof can be seen as a particular case of Lemma 2.2 in [25].
Proof. We inductively construct a history π = π0π1 . . . πn that is not too long and visits
precisely those states that are visited by ρ.
The initial state is π0 = ρ0. Then assume we have constructed π≤k = π0 . . . πk which visits
exactly the same states as ρ≤k′ for some k
′. If all the states of ρ have been visited in π≤k then
the construction is over. Otherwise there is an index i such that ρi does not appear in π≤k.
The smallest such i is therefore the next target : define t(π≤k) = min{i | ∀j ≤ k. πj 6= ρi}.
Now consider the occurrence of the current state πk that is the closest to the target in ρ:
c(π≤k) = max{i < t(π≤k) | πk = ρi}. Run π emulates what happens at that position by
choosing πk+1 = ρc(π≤k)+1. Then πk+1 is either the target ρt(π≤k), or a state that has already
been seen before in π≤k, in which case the resulting π≤k+1 visits exactly the same states as
ρ≤c(π≤k)+1.
At each step, either the number |Occ(ρ)\Occ(π≤k) | of remaining targets strictly decreases,
or the number of remaining targets is constant but the distance t(π≤k) − c(π≤k) to the next
target strictly decreases. Therefore the construction terminates. Moreover, notice that be-
tween two targets the same state is never visited twice, and only states that have already been
visited, or the target, are visited. As the number of targets is bounded by n, we obtain that
the length of the path π is bounded by 1+ |n| · (|n| − 1)/2. In addition, states of π are always
picked from ρ, ensuring that at each step Occ(π≤k) ⊆ Occ(ρ).
Using similar ideas, we now inductively construct τ = τ0τ1 . . . τm, which visits precisely
those states which are seen infinitely often along ρ, and which is not too long. Let ℓ be the
least index after which the states visited by ρ are visited infinitely often: ℓ = min{i | ∀j ≥
i. ρj ∈ Inf(ρ)}. The run ρ≥ℓ is such that Inf(ρ≥ℓ) = Inf(ρ). Run τ can be built in the same
way as π above, but for play ρ≥ℓ. As a by-product, we also get c(τ≤k), for k < m.
For π · τω to be a real run, π must be joined to τ , and τ must be joined to itself. The last
state of π must be the first state of τ (and similarly the last state of τ must also be its first
state). This possibly requires appending some more states to π and τ : the target of π and
τ is set to be τ0, and the same construction as previously is applied. As before, the added
states belong to ρ (resp. ρ≥ℓ), ensuring that Occ(π) = Occ(ρ) (resp. Inf(τ) = Inf(ρ)). The
total length of the resulting paths π and τ is bounded by 1 + (n − 1) · (n + 2)/2 which less
than n2.
Lemma 4.33. There is a word in Φ if and only if there are histories π and τ of length bounded
by (|G|×|A|)2, such that π ·τω is a path in the product G×A, τω satisfies the circuit condition
defining Out(S∗), and τ visits an accepting state of A.
Proof. By applying the preceding lemma to the product automaton G ×A.
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1 MCunderADM(G0, φ)::= begin
2 Compute (G, ψ) as automaton with circuit condition for Out(S∗(G0));
// see Section 4.3.
3 Compute the machine representing the Bu¨chi automaton A accepting L(¬φ);
4 ℓ := 0;
5 Nondeterministically set s ∈ V and q ∈ Q an initial state of A;
6 Inπ := true;
7 while Inπ ∧ ℓ ≤ (|G| × |A|)2 do
8 Guess s′ such that s→ s′; s := s′;
9 Guess q′ such that q
s′
−→ q′; q := q′;
10 Guess a boolean value for Inπ; ℓ := ℓ+ 1;
11 if Inπ then return false ; // ℓ reached its bound
12 else
13 t := s; p := q; ℓ := 0; X := ∅; b := false;
14 while ¬((s, q) = (t, p) ∧X  ψ ∧ b) ∧ ℓ ≤ (|G| × |A|)2 do
15 Guess s′ such that s→ s′; s := s′; X := X ∪ {s′};
16 Guess q′ such that q
s′
−→ q′; q := q′; b := b ∨ (q′ ∈ F );
17 ℓ := ℓ+ 1;
18 if (s, q) = (t, p) ∧X  ψ ∧ b then return true;
19 else return false ; // ℓ reached its bound
Algorithm 2: PSPACE algorithm for the model-checking under admissibility problem.
From this lemma we deduce the non-deterministic polynomial space Algorithm 2 to decide
the model-checking under admissibility problem.
The algorithm looks for π and τ satisfying the conditions of Lemma 4.33. It remembers
the length ℓ of the path guessed so far. This length is bounded6 by (|G| × |A|)2, which is
exponential in the input, hence can be stored in polynomial space. The algorithm also stores
the current states of both G and A (s and q, respectively) and the last states of G and A at
the end of π – therefore the beginning of τ – (t and p, respectively). Since there is only an
exponential number of states in A (and a polynomial one in G), coding a state can be done in
polynomial space. In order to check that the winning conditions are satisfied, the algorithm
remembers the set X of states of G that have been visited (by τ), and the Boolean b telling
whether an accepting state of A as been visited (again, by τ). In the end, the fact that τ is
actually a looping path is also checked by testing (s, q) = (t, p). Note that the paths π and τ
in G must respect the local conditions (e.g. a player does not take an edge that decreases his
value).
The correctness of the algorithm follows by Lemma 4.33, it terminates and use only poly-
nomial space. Hence the model-checking under admissibility problem is in PSPACE.
PSPACE-hardness derives from the PSPACE-hardness of LTL model-checking [9]. This
concludes the proof of Theorem 4.3.
6If the bound is reached, the algorithm rejects the run.
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5 Example: a metro system
5.1 The model of the system
We illustrate the use of model-checking under admissibility over the following metro system.
The metro track is composed of a directed ring divided in n slots (one can assume for example
that even-numbered slots represent a station, while odd-numbered slots represent a section
of track between two stations). There are p trains numbered 1 to p on the track, initially at
positions p− 1, . . . , 0 (hence train number 1 starts in front of the others (see Figure 7). In the
sequel we study the case of a track of length 6 with two trains t1 and t2.
0 1
4 3
25
12
Figure 7: Metro track with n = 6 and p = 2, at their initial position (1, 0).
At each step, all the trains successively declare whether they want to advance or not.
Once everyone has chosen, all trains try to move synchronously. However, there is an evil
environment env that can prevent trains from moving (for example by activating an alarm on
the section the train is trying to move in). That means some trains that wanted to move may
in fact remain in their position. Nevertheless, all other trains must comply with their original
choice, modeling the fact that trains cannot communicate7 in real-time. Additionally, if at
any point two trains are on the same track section, they collide and the game stops. (Part
of) the game graph for this protocol is depicted in Figure 8. In this game, the configuration
of the track is given by the pair of positions for t1 and t2, and their respective wish to move
or stay in place by the symbols “→” (advance) or “↓” (stay in place).
The objective of both trains is to loop infinitely often, which can be expressed by a gener-
alized Bu¨chi winning condition8 requiring visiting infinitely often both sections 0 and 1. The
objective of the environment is to give rise to a collision: since collision are sink states it
is equivalent to a Bu¨chi winning condition over the set of collision states. Globally, we are
interested in knowing whether the LTL formula ψ¬coll that expresses that no collision ever
happens is satisfied under admissibility. Remark that here:
• no player has a winning strategy alone;
• the formula ψ¬coll is not verified on all paths of the model;
• that the players are not a priori trying to satisfy ψ¬coll: indeed, the environment’s
objective is to negate ψ¬coll.
In the sequel we will show that the mechanism of admissibility enforces the satisfaction
of ψ¬coll, although each train cannot guarantee that its objective will be fulfilled and ψ¬coll is
not an explicit requirement in the objective of any player.
7Although some kind of communication permits the trains to make their choice knowing in which sections
the other trains are and what choice has been made by the trains with lower indices.
8This condition can therefore be expressed by a Bu¨chi condition on a graph with memory of visits to 0 or
1. It can also be expressed by a circuit condition encoding formula
∨
(0, ) ∧
∨
(1, ).
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(1, 0), (↓,⊥)
(1, 0)
(→,→)
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(1, 0)
(↓,→)
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(↓, ↓)
(2, 1)
(2, 0)
(1, 1)
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e
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both
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2
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1
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Figure 8: Part of the game played by the trains and the environment when trying to move from
the original position. Round states belong to train t1, square ones to train t2, and triangular
ones to the environment. Dotted edges are eliminated in the first iteration. Dashed ones in
the second iteration.
5.2 Strategy elimination
5.2.1 Value computation for first iteration
At the first iteration, players for both trains never have a winning strategy for their winning
condition that requires infinitely many visits to both positions 0 and 1: they cannot prevent,
for example, the environment from always blocking their movement. Note that one train can
also make the other one lose on its own, by choosing to always stay in the same position.
On the other hand, in all states but the one with a collision, e.g. state (1, 1), both trains
may achieve their goal if the other players cooperate. Hence the value of states for both train
players is 0 except in collision states, where it is −1.
For the environment player, however, there are states where he can force a collision, and
hence has a winning strategy: whenever train 2 is right behind train 1 and train 2 has decided
to move, which happens for example in states (1, 0), (→,→) and (1, 0), (↓,→) in Figure 8.
These states therefore have value 1 for the env. Additionally, from collision states the envi-
ronment has already won, hence their value is also 1. From other states, if trains chose to
never move, for example, env will not achieve its goal. And they can also chose to reach a
winning state for env, hence the value from other states is 0.
5.2.2 Strategy elimination for first iteration
From the values computed above, we first see that env eliminates all strategies that do not go
to a collision state whenever it is possible: this amounts to removing some edge that originate
from winning state, for example the dotted edges stemming from states (1, 0), (→,→) and
(1, 0), (↓,→) in Figure 8.
Note that the strategy of env that always blocks train 1 if he is the only train wishing
to move (in state (1, 0), (→, ↓)), which may end up losing for env if both players repeat their
choice, is not eliminated, since this play traverses infinitely often state (1, 0), (→,⊥), which is
a “Help!”-state for player env.
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Players t1 eliminates for example the strategy that always stays in the same position,
because it is always losing with respect to his objective. However, although it is intuitively
not a good choice for t1 to always choose to “stay” in position 1, the play(
(0, 1), (⊥,⊥)
stay
−−→ (1, 0), (↓,⊥)
stay
−−→ (1, 0), (↓, ↓) −→ (0, 1), (⊥,⊥)
)ω
is an outcome of an admissible strategy. For example, consider the strategy of t1 that tries to
move only if the path
(0, 1), (⊥,⊥)
stay
−−→ (1, 0), (↓,⊥)
move
−−−→ (1, 0), (↓,→)
block2
−−−−→ (0, 1), (⊥,⊥)
is taken first9. Against a strategy of t2 that always chooses not to move, the aforementioned
loop is the outcome of the game. This is a consequence of the fact that (1, 0), (↓,⊥) is a
“Help!”-state for player t1.
Similarly, all states of t1 are “Help!”-states for player t2.
As a result, the outcomes of strategies admissible after the first phase of elimination are
all paths that never use the dotted transitions of player env.
5.2.3 Second iteration
At the second iteration, the value for player env do not change. On the other hand, the states
where player env can force a collision are now losing for players t1 and t2, and hence now have
value −1.
As a result, player t2 will never play the transitions that lead to these states (the dashed
transitions in Figure 8). However, the “Help!”-states for player t1 and t2 are the same, hence
the outcomes of strategies admissible after two iterations remains unchanged (except for these
local conditions).
5.2.4 Third and fourth iteration
At these iterations the values do not change. Nonetheless, some “Help!”-states have to be
removed. For example, state (1, 0), (↓,⊥) belonging to t2 is not a “Help!”-state of t1 anymore.
Hence any admissible strategy must, from (0, 1), (⊥,⊥), try to move infinitely often.
Neither values nor sets of admissible strategies change at the fourth iteration, meaning the
set Out(S∗) has been computed.
5.2.5 Analysis of Out(S∗)
In this set, one can see that whenever t2 is right behind t1:
• t2 never tries to move;
• t1 infinitely tries to move;
As a result, one can see there can be no collision, hence the objective ψ¬coll is satisfied.
Hence, the model-checking under admissibility problem answers positively for ψ¬coll, while
the (“classical”) model-checking problem for the same formula answers negatively.
This also shows for example that the winning coalition problem with env ∈ W answers
negatively: there is no admissible profile that makes player env win.
On the other hand, it cannot be assured that t1 and t2 will win for their objective: the en-
vironment can choose to always block their movement, preventing them from looping infinitely
often on the track.
9One can show that this strategy is indeed admissible.
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6 Weak objectives
In this section, we assume that the winning conditions are weak circuit condition. We will
show the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1. The winning coalition problem for weak Muller conditions is PSPACE-complete.
Proposition 6.2. For weak Muller conditions, the value of a history only depends on the set
Occ(h) of states that have been visited and on s = last(h) the last state of the history.
Proof. A weak Muller condition can be transformed into a prefix-independent one by re-
membering which states have already been visited, this is a consequence of the fact that for
prefix-independent objectives the value depends only on the last state of the history.
We will thus simply write Valnj (R, s) for Val
n
j (h) where R = Occ(h) and s = last(h). The
core of the argument consists in proving that the value for given R and s can be computed in
polynomial space.
Lemma 6.3. For every iteration n, player i, state s, and set of states R, the value of
Valnj (R, s) can be computed in polynomial space.
Proof. We define a recursive procedure Proc(R,n) which computes the value Valni (R, s) for
each player i and state s. This procedure relies on the conditions Θni (and Ψ
n
i ) from Section 4.4,
but require them to maintain R as the set of states visited so far. Namely,
Θni (R) = Θ
n
i ∩Occ
−1(R) and Ψni (R) = Ψ
n
i ∩Occ
−1(R) .
Given R and n, Proc(R,n) works as follows.
• Compute the condition Θni (R). In that case Wini is a trivial condition (either true if
R satisfies Wini or false otherwise) so we can use the polynomial space algorithm of
Section 4. Note that the computation of this condition may require computing value of
some state for some n′ < n, this will be done by recursive call to Proc(R,n′).
• Do the same thing for Ψni (R).
• For each transition s → s′ with s ∈ R and s′ 6∈ R we compute Valni (R
′, s′) with R′ =
R ∪ {s′}. This is done by a recursive call to Proc(R′, n); note that R′ strictly contains
R.
• If from s, there is a strategy of player i such that any outcome either:
– stays in R and is winning for Θni (R);
– or the first state reached outside of R has value 1;
then s has value 1.
• If there is no strategy profile that satisfies Φni (R) and no profile whose outcome from s
leaves R for s′ /∈ R with Valni (R ∪ s
′, s′) ≥ 0, then s has value −1.
• In the other cases s has value 0.
At each recursive call either n decreases or the size of R strictly increases, therefore the
height of the stack of recursive call is bounded by n+|V |. The computation, ignoring recursive
calls, can be done in polynomial space. Thus the global procedure works in polynomial
space.
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xi
xi
(a) Mxi
¬xi
¬xi
(b) M¬xi
Mφ ∃
(c) Gφ
Figure 9: Modules for the definition of the game Gφ. A label y inside a state q denotes that
q ∈ Good y; a label y below a state q denotes that q ∈ Vy. Note that Eve is abbreviated ∃.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Let W and L be the sets of players that should win and lose, respec-
tively. We guess a lasso path ρ such that Occ(ρ) = R such that for i ∈ W , R  ϕi and for
i ∈ L, R 2 ϕi, where for i ∈ P , ϕi is the formula over V defined by the circuit for the winning
condition of i.
Let n0 be the iteration after which the values do not change, and assume we have, with
Proc(R,n0), computed the values for all players and states.
We check that ρ is the outcome of an admissible profile. In order to do that, ρ is divided
into ρ = ρ1 · ρω2 . Note that we can choose Occ(ρ1) = R, |ρ1| ≤ |V |
2 (since a visit to a state of
R may require a path of length at most |V |), and |ρ2| ≤ |V | (we have also Occ(ρ2) ⊆ R). We
first check that in ρ1, no player ever lower its own value.
We then check that ρω2 , the looping part of ρ, is part of an admissible profile that stays in
R, i.e.:
ρω2 ∈ Out(S
n0) ∩Occ−1(R)
where Out(Sn0) is computed as in Section 4.4 with trivial objectives for all players:
Out(Sn0) =
n0⋂
n=0
⋂
i∈P
L(Ani ).
In particular, no player can decrease its own value. Note that the definition of the winning
condition of these automata requires the values of states at previous iterations, which is
provided by calls to Proc(R,n).
PSPACE-hardness is given by Lemma 3.9.
In section 3, the winning coalition problem was proved PSPACE-hard even for the special
case of safety conditions. The problem is in fact also PSPACE-hard for reachability conditions.
Lemma 6.4. The winning coalition problem for reachability conditions is PSPACE-hard, even
for sets of players such that |W | = 1 and L = ∅.
Proof. This is essentially the same proof than for safety, we will therefore only insist on the
differences.
• If φ = xi we define the module Mφ in which player xi has a choice between winning or
letting the game continue.
• If φ = ¬xi the construction is similar, with player ¬xi replacing xi.
• The other modules are defined in the same way than in Lemma 3.9.
The game Gφ is obtained by directing the remaining outgoing transitions to a winning state
for Eve.
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Given a history h of the game, we write γ(h) = {i ∈ P | ∃k. hk ∈ Good i} the set of players
who already won in that history. We associate to such a set of player a valuation vγ such that:
vγ(xi) =


1 if xi ∈ γ
0 if ¬xi ∈ γ ∧ xi /∈ γ
undefined otherwise
If ℓ is a literal, the strategies of S1ℓ are exactly the one such that if ℓ 6∈ γ(h) and last(h) ∈ Vℓ,
take the transition to the state in Good ℓ.
Now Eve should only visit a state controlled by ℓ if it has already been visited in the past.
We are in the same situation than in the proof of Lemma 3.9, so the remainder of the proof
is exactly the same.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides new fundamental complexity and algorithmic results on the iterated
elimination of dominated strategies in the context of turn-based n-player perfect informa-
tion ω-regular games. We have shown that the non-elementary complexity of the plain tree-
automata-based procedure suggested in [5] can be avoided, and our precise complexity results
show that iterated elimination of dominated strategies is a computationally viable alternative
to Nash equilibria.
Future directions include investigating extensions with imperfect information, with quan-
titative objectives, or richer interaction models like concurrent games.
References
[1] A. Pnueli and R. Rosner. On the synthesis of a reactive module. In Proc. of POPL’89,
pages 179–190, 1989.
[2] John Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proc. of the National Academy of
Sciences, 36(1):48–49, 1950.
[3] Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.
[4] Robert Aumann. Agreeing to disagree. Annals of Statistics, 4(6):1236–1239, 1976.
[5] Dietmar Berwanger. Admissibility in infinite games. In Proc. of STACS’07, volume 4393
of LNCS, pages 188–199. Springer, February 2007.
[6] Marcin Jurdzin´ski. Deciding the winner in parity games is in UP and in co-UP. Infor-
mation Processing Letters, 68(3):119–124, 1998.
[7] Marcin Jurdzin´ski, Mike Paterson, and Uri Zwick. A deterministic subexponential al-
gorithm for solving parity games. In Proc. of SODA’06, pages 117–123. ACM Press,
January 2006.
[8] Amir Pnueli. The temporal logic of programs. In Proc. of the 18th Annual Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science (FoCS’77), pages 46–57. IEEE Computer Society,
October 1977.
[9] Aravinda P. Sistla and Edmund M. Clarke. The complexity of propositional linear tem-
poral logics. Journal of the ACM, 32(3):733–749, July 1985.
38
[10] Krishnendu Chatterjee, Thomas A. Henzinger, and Nir Piterman. Strategy logic. Infor-
mation and Computation, 208(6):677–693, 2010.
[11] Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano, and Moshe Y. Vardi. Reasoning about strategies.
In Proc. of FSTTCS’10, volume 8 of LIPIcs, pages 133–144. Schloss Dagstuhl - LZI,
December 2010.
[12] Michael Ummels. The complexity of Nash equilibria in infinite multiplayer games. In
Proc. of FoSSaCS’12, volume 4962 of LNCS, pages 20–34. Springer, 2008.
[13] Patricia Bouyer, Romain Brenguier, Nicolas Markey, and Michael Ummels. Concurrent
games with ordered objectives. In Proc. of FoSSaCS’12, volume 7213 of LNCS, pages
301–315. Springer, March 2012.
[14] Miroslav Klimosˇ, Kim Guldstrand Larsen, Filip Stefanak, and Jeppe Thaarup. Nash
equilibria in concurrent priced games. In Proc. of LATA’12, volume 7183 of LNCS.
Springer, 2012.
[15] Emmanuel Filiot, Tristan Le Gall, and Jean-Franc¸ois Raskin. Iterated regret minimization
in game graphs. In Proc. of MFCS’10, pages 342–354, 2010.
[16] Michael Ummels. Stochastic Multiplayer Games: Theory and Algorithms. PhD thesis,
RWTH Aachen University, 2010.
[17] John H. Reif. The complexity of two-player games of incomplete information. Journal of
Computer and System Sciences, 29(2):274–301, 1984.
[18] Uri Zwick and Mike Paterson. The complexity of mean payoff games on graphs. Theo-
retical Computer Science, 158(1&2):343–359, 1996.
[19] Luca de Alfaro, Thomas A. Henzinger, and Orna Kupferman. Concurrent reachability
games. Theoretical Computer Science, 386(3):188–217, 2007.
[20] Paul Hunter. Complexity and Infinite Games on Finite Graphs. PhD thesis, Computer
Laboratory, University of Cambridge, 2007.
[21] Anuj Dawar, Florian Horn, and Paul Hunter. Complexity Bounds for Muller Games.
Theoretical Computer Science, 2013. Submitted.
[22] E.A. Emerson and C.S. Jutla. Tree automata, mu-calculus and determinacy. In Proc. of
FCS’91, pages 368–377. IEEE, 1991.
[23] Gilles Brassard. A note on the complexity of cryptography. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, 25(2):232–233, March 1979.
[24] A. Prasad Sistla, Moshe Y. Vardi, and Pierre Wolper. The complementation problem for
Bu¨chi automata with appplications to temporal logic. Theorethical Computer Science,
49:217–237, 1987.
[25] Romain Brenguier. E´quilibres de Nash dans les Jeux Concurrents – Application aux Jeux
Temporise´s. The`se de doctorat, Laboratoire Spe´cification et Ve´rification, ENS Cachan,
France, November 2012.
39
